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“It is worth taking the Court at its word, at least to see where that can lead
1
us.”

ABSTRACT
In this Article, I argue for a new understanding of the immutability factor employed by courts in
determining which classifications ought to receive suspect status under the Equal Protection Clause.
Drawing on the process-based foundations of the Equal Protection Clause, this new understanding
defines immutable traits not as traits that cannot be changed, but as traits that are in the words of the
2
Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, mere “accident[s] of birth.” In contrast, courts and
scholars typically center the immutability inquiry on an individual’s technical ability to exit a
particular class, which has led to inconsistencies in applying equal protection doctrine to criminality,
alienage, and sexual preference classifications.
Understanding immutability in this way is vital given the ongoing litigation surrounding same-sex
marriage. Courts, in addressing whether sexual preference can constitute a suspect classification, all
too often get bogged down in biological studies or psychological profiling in an attempt to determine
whether sexual preference is something that can be changed. In doing so, courts often import
definitions of immutability from other doctrinal contexts, such as asylum or Title VII law. Doing so
simply confuses the type of inquiry underlying the principles driving the Supreme Court’s process-based
approach to the Equal Protection Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
If trends in legal scholarship serve as any indication, scholars are
hoping that the immutability factor simply disappears. The list of
complaints with the immutability factor’s role in constructing suspect
3
classifications for Equal Protection purposes continues to grow, and
the list of defenders of immutability as a useful doctrinal tool has
4
nearly shrunk to zero. Some claim that immutability is the doctrinal
equivalent of the appendix—a hanging appendage that no longer
5
serves any useful doctrinal purpose. Indeed, they claim, it has no
real relationship with the true organizing principle of the Equal Protection Clause—to protect precariously positioned minorities from
6
failures of the democratic process. Other scholars have noted that
immutability seems to be a proxy for the relevance of a particular
7
trait to a given governmental enactment, and a poor proxy at that.
Such arguments typically end by calling upon courts to directly consider any number of substantive principles that are viewed as advancing the underlying logic of the Equal Protection Clause without con8
sidering whether or not the traits in question are immutable.

3

4

5
6
7
8

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150
(1980); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989); Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the
Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2003); E. Gary Spitko, A
Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism: Implications for Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 571, 598 (1996) (“A careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence reveals . . . that immutability of a characteristic is neither a prerequisite to nor a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny of a
classification relating to that characteristic.”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108
YALE L.J. 485 (1998); Marc R. Shapiro, Comment, Treading the Supreme Court’s Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 409 (2003); see also infra notes 77–96 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 647–48
(2001) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to find the last academic defense of immutability or
the last call for stressing it in constitutional litigation”); Yoshino, supra note 3, at 491 (describing attacks on immutability as “flog[ging] a dying horse”); Jonathan Pickhardt, Note,
Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 942 (1998) (“Arguments for suspect classification status for sexual orientation
based on immutability have been almost completely rejected.”).
See infra notes 97–114 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.
See ELY, supra note 3; see also infra Section VII.
See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2323–24 (1997) (arguing that the real question for classification ought to be whether the particular characteristic can sustain a stable social meaning); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
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And yet, even in the face of all this criticism, the immutability factor continues to animate judicial decisions, serving as a focal point in
the ongoing litigations over state statutory schemes prohibiting same9
sex marriage. Indeed, immutability received its most recent atten10
11
12
tion in the California, Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme Court de-

9

10

Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 155 (1976); Halley, supra note 3, at 50–63 (adopting First
Amendment distinctions between speech and conduct in order to determine when interference with legislation on substantive grounds is legitimate); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994); Tribe, supra note 3, at 1066–67 (arguing that
substantive justifications for the suspect classification status lurk behind the standard
process-based account); Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1532–34 (1989) (arguing in favor of granting homosexuality suspect
status on multiple grounds including the equal worth of human beings); cf., Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 533 (2004) (arguing in favor of a
new context-sensitive test for evaluating potential Equal Protection violations, including
consideration of “whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or stereotyping of
the class”).
See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 939 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., concurring) (arguing that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” discriminates on the basis of a combination of both
status and conduct, which prevents the underlying classification from being termed immutable); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th
Cir. 1990) (“Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence
is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes.”); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699,
726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (noting that immutability “may describe those
traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government
to penalize a person for refusing to change them,” thereby making sexual orientation
immutable); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Homosexuality, as a definitive trait, differs fundamentally from those defining any of the recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes. Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect
classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality
is primarily behavioral in nature.”); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that sexual orientation classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny because, inter alia, sexual orientation is a
characteristic “beyond the control of the individual”), rev’d 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995),
vacated 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), reinstated on reh’g 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Jantz v. Muci,
759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) (defining immutable traits as those that can be
changed “only . . . at a prohibitive cost” and finding sexual orientation to be immutable),
rev’d 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330 (D.C.
1995) (concluding that “the question whether appellants’ constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws, while not presenting any genuine issue of material ‘adjudicative’ fact in this case, requires . . . some findings about the origins of homosexuality and the extent to which sexual orientation is immutable”); Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that sexual orientation was an immutable trait and therefore had failed to satisfy all
necessary elements for achieving suspect status).
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43, 452 (Cal. 2008). The issue of same-sex marriage has remained hotly contested because of the continued controversy over California’s Proposition 8, which effectively overturned the California Supreme Court’s ruling
that the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage was unconstitutional under California’s
state constitution. See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California.”); Text of Proposed Laws, available at
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cisions considering same-sex marriage, and has been an important
13
piece of any number of decisions considering the issue. Moreover,
given the sharp increase in litigation surrounding same-sex marriage,
the number of cases focusing on immutability is clearly slated for an
14
upswing.
But understanding the persistence of immutability first requires
defining the term. While some authors and judges often adduce the
15
dictionary definition in order to facilitate analysis, the very definition of the term remains deeply ambiguous. In this Article, I argue
that it is confusion over the basic definition of immutability that has
led, in part, to the criticism of its inclusion in equal protection analy-

11
12
13

14

15

http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposedlaws.pdf; see also State Election Results, Election Center 2008, CNN.com, http://www.
cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/state/#CA (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). The California
Supreme Court subsequently upheld Proposition 8 in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009); see also News Release, Judicial Council of California, California Supreme Court
Takes
Action
on
Proposition
8
(Nov.
19,
2008),
available
at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR66-08.PDF; Jesse McKinley,
Top Court in California Will Review Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A20.
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008).
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 886–87 (Iowa 2009).
The issue of immutability was emphasized in the following decisions: Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Littleton
v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Andersen
v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006); and Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974).
Indeed, in the last ten years, an increasing number of states have considered the question, in various forms, of whether statutory provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage are
constitutional. Examples of these state decisions include: Standhardt v. Superior Court ex
rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the state constitution did not guarantee a right to same-sex marriage); Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384;
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427–28 (“It is evident, moreover, that immutability and minority status or political powerlessness are subsidiary to the first two primary factors because . . . the
Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to a group whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable.”); Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that the state’s statutory scheme, understood as prohibiting samesex marriage, did not violate the state constitution), aff’d 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002); In re
Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (prohibiting same-sex marriage);
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that Indiana’s Defense
of Marriage Act did not violate the state constitution); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862; Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that prohibiting same-sex marriage does
not violate the state constitution); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that New York’s marriage statutes, which do not permit same-sex marriage, were not
unconstitutional); Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972–74 (Mass.
2003) (holding that denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple was unconstitutional
under the Massachusetts constitution); Conaway, 932 A.2d at 635 (upholding the state’s
statutory scheme that defined marriage as between a “man” and a “woman”); Andersen,
138 P.3d at 990 (holding that Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act did not violate the
state constitution).
See infra note 77.
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sis. Indeed, this confusion goes far beyond debates over functional
16
versus constructive immutability. Scholars and courts alike regularly
demonstrate a basic uncertainty as to whether an immutable trait is a
17
18
trait that has not been chosen, a trait that cannot be changed, or a
19
trait that an individual should not be forced to change.
The continued division over the very definition of immutability
can be seen in the California, Connecticut, and Iowa state supreme
court decisions addressing statutory provisions prohibiting same-sex
20
marriage. While all three courts, on the surface, advanced similar
21
definitions of the term, their analyses of the immutability factor
clearly indicate three very different understandings of what immuta22
bility means.
On the one hand, the Iowa Supreme Court held that “the immutability ‘prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied
when . . . the identifying trait is so central to a person’s identity that it
would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing

16

17

18
19

20
21

22

See Knauer, supra note 3, at 74 (noting that “[t]he handful of judicial opinions that have
advocated heightened scrutiny for gay men and lesbians have not required strict immutability, but have instead focused on whether sexual orientation is difficult to change”); see
generally Marcosson, supra note 4, at 650 (arguing for “a new vision of immutability, . . . ‘constructive immutability,’ which overcomes the objections of social construction
theory by showing that a characteristic can be, for all relevant legal and political purposes, immutable even if it is the product of social construction”).
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Harris, 537 F.2d 563, 565 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 757
(E.D. Pa. 1975); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (focusing on the voluntariness of entering a classification). For a discussion of Plyler and its use of an entrancebased definition of immutability, see infra notes 203–09 and accompanying text.
This is of course the dominant definition. See infra note 77 (collecting examples).
See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); Able v. United
States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir.
1998); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that sexual orientation is not “easily mutable”) (emphasis added) rev’d 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); In re AM-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–74 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211
(B.I.A. 1985); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442.
See supra notes 10–12.
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442–43 (defining an immutable trait as a trait over which an
individual does not have “control”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
436 (Conn. 2008) (defining immutability as “[t]he degree to which an individual controls, or cannot avoid, the acquisition of a defining trait, and the relative ease or difficulty
with which a trait can be changed”) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,
346 (D.C. 1995)); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 892 (Iowa 2009) (“A human trait
that defines a group is ‘immutable’ when the trait exists ‘solely by the accident of birth,’
or when the person with the trait has no ability to change it.”) (citations omitted).
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442–43; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 892–
93.
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23

to change [it].’” In other words, the Iowa Supreme Court held that
because sexual orientation is so central to an individual’s identity,
sexual orientation is, in fact, immutable for the purposes of suspect
classification analysis. In this way, the argument from identity helped
satisfy the immutability inquiry.
In contrast, the Connecticut Supreme Court appears to have concluded that the identity argument explains not why the immutability
factor was satisfied, but why sexual orientation could be deemed a
suspect classification even if the immutability factor were not satisfied. In doing so, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained that
immutability is a factor that is meant to aid courts in determining
24
whether particular discrimination is “unfair,” and whether the
25
members of the class are truly being “victimized.” In turn, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “[i]n view of the central role
that sexual orientation plays in a person’s fundamental right to selfdetermination,” sexual orientation classifications should receive
26
heightened scrutiny. And, the Connecticut Supreme Court believed
that because the “identifying trait is so central to a person’s identity . . . it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for
27
refusing to change it.” Accordingly, the court believed that “it [was]
not necessary . . . to decide whether sexual orientation is immutable in
the same way and to the same extent that race, national origin and
28
gender are immutable.” In this way, the identity argument appears
to have explained why the Connecticut Supreme Court did not believe sexual orientation’s immutability was relevant for its suspectclassification analysis.
The California Supreme Court’s decision is ambiguous on this
point, failing to clarify exactly how it understands the impact of the
identity argument on the application of the immutability factor.
Thus, the California Supreme Court stated that “[b]ecause a person’s
sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not
appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her

23
24
25
26
27
28

Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893 (quoting Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 436 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
909 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting)).
Id. (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d at 346 (Ferren, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
Id. at 438.
Id. (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
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sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.” In
supporting this proposition, the California Supreme Court relied on
a Ninth Circuit decision addressing the definition of immutability,
which provided an alternative definition of immutability in the context of asylum law: “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity . . . are
so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be re30
quired to abandon them.” In reaching this conclusion, the California Supreme Court did not explain why the fact that sexual orientation is so important to an individual’s identity entails not requiring
sexual orientation to be immutable. This may be because—as per the
Iowa Supreme Court—when a trait is fundamental to an individual’s
identity, it is considered, for the purposes of suspect-classification
analysis, immutable, or because—as per the Connecticut Supreme
Court—when a trait is fundamental to an individual’s identity, it is
not required to be immutable.
As these examples demonstrate, the definition of immutability
remains contested, especially in its relationship to arguments about
the centrality of sexual orientation to individual identity. In merging
arguments from identity with the definition of immutability, courts
appear to struggle with defining immutability, unsure as to whether a
trait is immutable only when it is a trait that the individual can control, whether a trait is central to an individual’s identity, both or neither. And, as the aforementioned state supreme court decisions
demonstrate, this is even true among courts that reach near identical
31
outcomes; other courts, especially those reaching contrary outcomes, remain at odds over whether traits are immutable when the
traits have not been freely adopted, or alternatively when the traits
32
cannot be changed. Indeed, the divergence of various definitions of
the term immutability has left courts in a quandary when confronting
33
the term.
This Article argues that this confusion stems from, in part, a failure to recognize that the definition of immutability is clearly contextual. Already, immutability is understood differently when used in
34
35
the Title VII context, than when used in the asylum context. But
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008).
Id. (citing, inter alia, Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S. 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Marriage Cases,183 P.3d at 442–43; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 892 (Iowa 2009).
See infra notes 77, 191–92.
See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (outlining the various definitions of the
term immutability).
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.A.
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many courts have not appreciated the significance of this contextsensitivity, importing definitions from contexts whose internal logic is
36
not easily reconciled with the logic driving equal protection analysis.
By importing conflicting definitions, courts have obscured the definition of immutability in the equal protection context, making it difficult to understand the link between the immutability factor and the
underlying logic of suspect-classification analysis.
Accordingly, the twin goals of this Article are to highlight the contextual character of the immutability factor and to explore the potential link between immutability and the underlying logic of the Equal
37
Protection Clause. By mining the inner-logic of the equal protection doctrine—and not by importing incompatible definitions from
other doctrinal contexts—I argue that the immutability factor in the
equal protection context is not concerned with whether or not a trait
can be changed, but whether an individual chose the trait in question. Thus, the immutability inquiry in the equal protection context
is not concerned with whether people can exit a classification, but
whether they chose to enter the classification.
Using immutability to focus on entrance into a classification, as
opposed to exit from it, ensures that immutability advances one of
the primary principles underlying the suspect classification inquiry:
determining whether imposing “legal burdens” on the classification
38
“bear[s] some relationship to individual responsibility.” Indeed, it is
because of the unique purpose of deploying the immutability factor
in the equal protection context that the Supreme Court linked im39
mutable traits to “accident[s] of birth”; it is also why the D.C. Circuit
has noted on one occasion that “the ‘immutable characteristic’ notion, as it appears in Supreme Court decisions, is tightly-cabined. It
does not mean, broadly, something done that cannot be undone. In40
stead, it is a trait ‘determined solely by accident of birth.’” Defining
immutability in this way helps focus courts’ attention on whether the
classification in question could have been employed legitimately and,
in turn, highlights the way in which the immutability factor advances
the underlying process-based framework of the Equal Protection
Clause.

36
37
38
39
40

See infra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 165–92 and accompanying text.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
Id.
Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 229 n.11 (1981)).
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This definitional shift is of utmost importance to the continued
litigation surrounding same-sex marriage. Much of the debate concerning immutability and same-sex marriage has gotten bogged down
in biological and psychological studies regarding whether sexual pre41
ference is the type of trait that can be changed. While some courts
42
have embraced such questions, understanding immutability in the
equal protection context as completely uninterested in whether individuals can change a trait ensures that courts avoid the value-laden
waters of psycho-biology in favor of legal standards more familiar to
judicial determinations. As a result, reorienting immutability as concerned with entrance into a classification is vital if courts addressing
the continued litigation surrounding same-sex marriage are to apply
a set of doctrines that coheres with the Equal Protection Clause’s
process-based paradigm.
To do so, I begin, in Parts II through IV, by presenting the process-based account of equal protection. While this account is far from
43
free of critics, it persists, and continues to drive the “traditional indicia of suspectedness” which are consistently considered by the
Court in determining whether or not a particular classification ought
44
to be considered suspect. Doing so also serves to expose many of
41

42

43
44

For a general example, see Edward Stein, Born That Way? Not a Choice? Problems with Biological and Psychological Arguments for Gay Rights 5 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Cardozo
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
223,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1104538; see also David Orgon Coolidge, Should the Government Recognize Same-Sex Marriage? Session Two: Legal, Equitable, and
Political Issues, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 33, 40–42 (2000); David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 502–03 (1994); Edward Stein,
The Relevance of Scientific Research About Sexual Orientation to Lesbian and Gay Rights, 27 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 269 (1994) (discussing the relevance of scientific research to questions
of lesbian and gay rights); Lynn D. Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior and Their Relevance for Family Law Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 997
(2007) (focusing on “the biological effects of homosexual behavior on human health”);
Rachel Duffy Lorenz, Comment, Transgender Immigration: Legal Same-Sex Marriages and
Their Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 53 UCLA L. REV. 523, 528–29 (2005).
See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330–31 (D.C. 1995) (considering “the
nature and causes of homosexuality”); see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 615–16
n.57 (Md. 2007) (discussing scientific studies regarding sexual preferences and biological
“immutability”).
See infra note 55.
The Supreme Court has consistently relied upon what it has termed the “traditional indicia of suspectedness,” considering whether the class is “saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973)); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 n.13 (1976) (same); Mass. Bd. of
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the internal fissures in equal protection doctrine, highlighting the
need to reconsider the way in which the immutability factor fits within the overall structure of the Equal Protection Clause.
Next, in Part V, I examine the definitions of immutability in other
areas of law, specifically in the Title VII and asylum contexts. In turn,
I explain how different definitions of immutability fit within their respective areas of law, given the principles driving each of these legal
doctrines. Demonstrating how these various definitions of the term
immutability derive their definitions from their contexts exposes the
inherent fallacy of importing definitions of the term immutability
from other contexts. By noting that immutability’s definition is contextual, I point to the final task of this Article: to provide a definition
of immutability that coheres with the core principles of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Taking up this project in Part VI, I begin by harkening back to the
Supreme Court’s initial articulation of the immutability factor in Fron45
tiero v. Richardson. With our newfound emphasis on context, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court crafted its unique understanding
of immutability for the equal protection context in its initial articulation of the factor, describing the term as referring to accidents of
birth. It is this definition of immutability, focused on entrance into
the classification, that coheres with the process-based understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause underpinning the tiers of scrutiny approach currently employed in suspect classification analysis. In asking if a trait is an accident of birth, courts are able to successfully use
immutability as a proxy to determine whether a particular trait is relevant to the statute or governmental policy in question. In contrast,
I argue that the other definitions of immutability—whether or not an
individual can or should be required to change a trait and whether
an individual has control over a trait—accord with the overall purposes of other areas of law, such as asylum and Title VII law respectively.
In Part VII, I explore how this definition of the immutability factor obviates much of the criticism leveled against its use in suspectclassification analysis. In turn, I reconnect immutability to its con-

45

Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (same). These indicia continue to be employed
by the Federal Courts of Appeals. For cases illustrative of this principle, see Sonnier v.
Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349, 368 n.17 (5th Cir. 2007); Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v.
United States, 391 F.3d 338, 354 (1st Cir. 2004); Gary v. City of Warner Robins, 311 F.3d
1334, 1337 n.6 (11th Cir. 2002); Save Palisade FruitLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210
(10th Cir. 2002); Miller v. United States, 73 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1995).
411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973).
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text, providing an account of how the Court’s definition of the term
fits with the overall process-based scheme of the Equal Protection
Clause. Finally, in Part VIII, I consider how this new understanding
of the immutability factor frames the debate over same-sex marriage
by changing the way we evaluate whether sexual preference should be
considered a suspect classification.
I. REVISITING THE CANNON: SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AS DEMOCRACY
46
ENHANCING
In many ways, the story of suspect classifications begins with age47
old concerns regarding the “countermajoritarian difficulty.” At its
core, the countermajoritarian difficulty is meant to engage “the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a po48
litical democracy.” In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the answer has been to revisit the way in which the Equal Protection
Clause can be construed as a democracy-enhancing principle, one
that focuses on the way in which judicial review can explore and rec49
tify the potential pitfalls of an unbridled democratic system. Thus,
one concern regarding democracy left unchecked is the potential
that certain minority groups will simply not be represented in the
democratic process; moreover, the majority might impose severe
46

47

48
49

For a similar discussion as that found below and in Part II, see Michael A. Helfand, How
the Diversity Rationale Lays the Groundwork for New Discrimination: Examining the Trajectory of
Equal Protection Doctrine, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 614–18 (2009).
This term was famously coined by Alexander Bickel in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). For a
comprehensive review and analysis of the history of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of
an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE
L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Countermajoritarian, Part Five]. For additional authority, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Steven G.
Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373
(1998); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 (2004); Mark
Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995).
See Friedman, Countermajoritarian, Part Five, supra note 47, at 155.
This was most famously the aim of ELY, supra note 3, at 135–79.
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harms and restrictions on a particular minority group given the potential for festering animus towards that group. Indeed, this concern
50
is as old as the Constitution itself.
Construing the Equal Protection Clause as an answer to the countermajoritarian difficulty begins with footnote four in United States v.
51
Carolene Products Co. On the Court’s analysis, “discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition,” where legislation directed at
such minorities should be scrutinized under the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to insure that legislation does not “curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
52
protect minorities.” In Carolene Products, the Court also gave some
examples of what it might mean to be a “discrete and insular minor53
ity”: religious, national and racial minorities.
By sorting out particular minorities as worthy of particular protections, the Court both emphasized the potential problems of unbridled democracy and its potential solution. Using the Equal Protection Clause to subject certain legislation to “more searching judicial
54
inquiry” could fend off any legislative initiatives on the part of the
majority intended to politically debilitate minorities from getting a
fair shake in the political arena.
But this is all quite vague. The Court’s first foray into some scrutiny-based approach to the countermajoritarian difficulty left two
questions unanswered. First, what were the criteria for inclusion into
the category of “discrete and insular minorities;” second, what would
the contours of a scrutiny doctrine look like? It is into this vacuum
that the now well-rehearsed suspect classification and strict scrutiny
doctrines have been introduced.

50

51

52
53
54

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 40 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2003) (noting that “measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and
over-bearing majority”).
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). This is not to say that such reasoning is correct, only that it
is the route most typically traveled. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly referenced footnote
four in many of its Equal Protection cases. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 218 (1995) (citing footnote four of Carolene Products); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (same); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
288 (1978) (same); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (same). However,
Bruce Ackerman has famously argued that the “discrete and insular minority” analysis in
footnote four ignores the more precarious position of “anonymous and diffuse” groups.
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724 (1985).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
Id.
Id.
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II. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AND STRICT SCRUTINY: THE PROCESSBASED UNDERSTANDING
On the canonical story we have been recounting thus far, the doctrinal innovation of strict scrutiny links up directly with footnote four
55
in Carolene Products. It is on this account that the Court has described strict scrutiny as a tool “to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
56
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” In other words,
55

I refer here to the process-based understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as “canonical” not because it is a universally accepted framework to understand the Equal Protection Clause. To the contrary, scholars and judges continue to debate the merit of
other interpretive paradigms as applied to the Equal Protection Clause. Most notably,
there has been ample debate over the coherence of originalism as applied to the Equal
Protection Clause. For a discussion along these lines, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971); Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). In this
Article, I do not attempt to resolve this debate besides to note some of originalism’s most
formidable critics. For such critiques, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373
(1982); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1365 (1990); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 781 (1983).
Instead, when I describe the canonical account of the Equal Protection Clause as
process-based, I mean to express my own view that the dominant account that has animated the Supreme Court’s majority decisions regarding the Equal Protection Clause are
best described as grounded in a process-based theory. Of course, individual justices have
expressed their own affinities for originalism. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection,
Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 328–29 n.365 (1997) (recounting the affinities for originalism of various Supreme Court justices). But here, I try to
present the dominant theory that explains the Court’s decision. It is of this fact I hope
to, among other arguments, convince the reader in this Article. In turn, many of the
proceeding arguments are built off of this process-based theory. In this way, the conclusions of this Article are predicated on my view that a process-based theory, for the most
part, has animated the Court’s Equal Protection decisions.

56

J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493. Jed Rubenfeld, however, has noted that the Supreme
Court has advanced two conflicted views regarding the purpose of strict scrutiny. See Rubenfeld, supra note 55, at 428 (describing the shift in strict scrutiny). While on the one
hand the Court often emphasizes the way in which strict scrutiny can smoke out illegitimate purposes, it has also stated that strict scrutiny ensures that the goal being pursued is
important enough to justify the prima facie equal protection violation. Cf. Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944). Rubenfeld is critical of this second approach
to strict scrutiny in part because he understands rights as being the type of legal mechanism whose violation cannot be justified. Moreover, the implications of the justificatory
account do not, in Rubenfeld’s view, cohere with the multiple tiers of scrutiny invoked by
the court. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 55, at 428. For a response, see Helfand, supra note 46.
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strict scrutiny is used to investigate whether legislation containing a
suspect classification on its face does in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, it unmasks invidious legislation as enactments of the majority intended to harm a discrete and insular minority. But who qualifies as a discrete and insular minority? On the
canonical account, groups that evidence a likelihood to fall victim to
majoritarian politics are included; and it is these groups that are
deemed protected groups whose classifications are considered suspect.
It is thus unsurprising that at the core of the Supreme Court’s
case law determining which classifications are suspect, we find the following “traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is . . . saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
57
process.” Thus, either past history or current political demographics give us good reason to believe that certain protected classes have
not been appropriately represented in the political arena; in turn,
animus, and not deliberation, may serve as the motivation driving a
particular suspect classification on the face of a given piece of legisla58
tion.
But the purely process-based story cannot account for all the suspect classification criteria. Indeed, the Court, in Frontiero v. Richardson announced another set of criteria for qualifying to be a suspect
classification:
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of
their sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’
And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between
the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of

57

58

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”).
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females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
59
its individual members.

This statement by the Court is deeply puzzling. If we construct suspect classifications because we are concerned about the ability of particular groups to participate in the democratic process, why include
immutability on the list of criteria? It seemingly has no relationship
to our process-based account. At first glance, it is hard to envision
why a group having an immutable trait makes them more likely to be
left out—or discriminated against—by the majority through the political system; put another way, why should a group with an immutable trait be considered more “discrete and insular”? This tension—
what we might call the immutability problem—has occupied a wide
range of scholars, intent on unpacking the rationale behind using
60
immutability as a factor in equal protection analysis. We will turn to
some of these suggestions shortly.
To be sure, it is not only in the secondary literature that we find
some uneasiness regarding immutability. The Supreme Court itself
has backed off on applying the immutability factor in a number of
cases; indeed, it seems most accurate to say that the Court’s articulating of the immutability factor was done haltingly. Consider the following. The immutability factor was announced in Frontiero v. Rich61
ardson, a case decided on May 14, 1973. Interestingly, the Court
decided another equal protection case two months earlier—San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez—a case that considered
whether wealth discrimination constituted a classification of a pro62
tected class. One of the holdings of the case was that wealth classifications are not subjected to strict scrutiny because they do not consti63
tute discrimination against a suspect class. In light of the reasoning
soon to be announced in Frontiero, we might have expected the Court
to trumpet the fact that wealth discrimination is not an immutable
characteristic, thus bolstering the Court’s contention that it is not a
64
suspect class. Indeed, such an argument would have fit perfectly
with the primary holding of the case. And yet, the Court completely

59
60
61
62
63
64

Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 3, at 150; Halley, supra note 3; Richards, supra note 41 at 501–08;
Yoshino, supra note 3.
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 28.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in addressing a statute criminalizing homelessness, has noted
that homelessness is not immutable. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137
(9th Cir. 2006).
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ignored immutability, focusing instead solely on the lack of the “tra65
ditional” process-based criteria for suspect classification.
There have been other important instances where the Court has
ignored the immutability factor in deciding whether a particular
group ought to be considered a suspect class. In Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, the Court considered whether the elderly
66
should be deemed a suspect classification. Like in San Antonio Independent School District, the Court refused to expand the list of suspect
67
classes. And, like in San Antonio Independent School District, the Court
68
ignored the immutability factor in its analysis. While deciding how
to apply immutability to age is far from a simply matter, one would
have expected some discussion of the factor by the Court.
Even more notable is that the Court, at times, has explicitly questioned whether immutability ought to remain a factor in compiling a
list of suspect classes. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the
Court addressed whether a zoning ordinance prohibiting a home for
69
the “mentally retarded” violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
first step of such an analysis required determining whether the men70
tally retarded should be deemed a suspect class. The Court’s analysis noted, in passing, that mental retardation was an immutable characteristic, but such a characteristic was still a legitimate consideration
of the zoning ordinance: “[the mentally retarded] are thus different,
immutably so, in relevant respects, and the States’ interest in dealing
71
with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one.” In justifying this proposition, the Court cited John Hart Ely’s attack on the
immutability factor, noting its irrelevance to the process-based para72
digm of suspect classes. It is difficult to see the Court’s analysis and
citation as evincing anything but an extraordinary lack of comfort
with the immutability factor.
Lower courts, in dealing with similar equal protection claims to
suspect status, have taken note of the Court’s ambivalence towards
73
the immutability factor. For example, Judge Norris’s concurrence

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Id. at 312–14.
Id.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 439–47.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442–43 n.10.
See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Cleburne and noting that “[i]mmutability is merely one of several possible indications that a classification is
likely to reflect prejudice. Indeed, though alienage is not immutable, aliens are accorded
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in the Ninth Circuit’s Watkins v. United States Army expresses serious
ambivalence in considering whether immutability is relevant to equal
protection analysis, noting that the Court has both at times cast doubt
74
on using the immutability factor and at times simply refrained from
75
doing so itself. As Judge Norris makes clear, immutability’s place in
equal protection doctrine is unstable, primarily because its relationship to the process-based core of the suspect classification doctrine
76
remains unresolved.
III. ASSESSING THE PROCESS-PLUS-IMMUTABILITY PARADIGM: THE
CRIMINAL PROBLEM
Much of the problem with immutability stems from the lack of a
legal definition or defined role. Courts and scholars typically have
understood an immutable trait to refer to a trait that cannot be
77
changed. Unfortunately, given prior application of the immutability

74
75
76
77

heightened scrutiny”), rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Equal. Found.
of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 434 n.13 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (recognizing “that the Supreme Court has demonstrated some skepticism as to the
relevance of the immutability factor”), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S.
1001 (1996), reinstated on reh’g, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp.
1543, 1548 n.5 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court has refrained from applying the immutability factor on a number of occasions), rev’d, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.
1992).
875 F.2d 699, 725–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-05287, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34128, at *20 n.9
(E.D. Pa. May 26, 2006) (concluding that characteristics such as a person’s religion are
not immutable and defining immutability: “not subject to or susceptible of change; unchangeable, unalterable, changeless” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)); A.G.G. Enters. v. Washington County, 145
F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1227 (D. Or. 2001) (arguing that the trait in question was not immutable because it was subject to change); D’Amario v. Russo, 718 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D.R.I.
1989) (defining immutable as “not capable of change”); Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis.
Univ., 157 Or. App. 502, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 892–93
(Vt. 1999) (Dooley, J., concurring); Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with
Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 59 (2005) (“Immutability should be distinguished from
the related concept of accountability which addresses whether the individual acquired
the characteristic as a result of his or her own choices.”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 723 (2001) (noting that
“[o]ne difficulty with th[e] argument is that ‘performance’ is not an immutable characteristic. It is, by definition, changeable.”); Pamela J. Smith, Part I—Romantic Paternalism—
The Ties That Bind Also Free: Revealing the Contours of Judicial Affinity for White Women, 3 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 107, 170-71 (1999) (“The general definitions support this type of
use. For instance, Webster’s Dictionary defines an immutable characteristic as that which is
‘unchangeable; unalterable; changeless.’”); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as
an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade
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factor, “cannot” may not be understood in the strictest sense. If immutability is taken to mean an inability to exit, then application of
the immutability factor must center on what it might mean to be unable to change a characteristic. For example, sex is considered im78
79
mutable, and yet it can most definitely be changed. This has led
some courts and scholars to modify the definition of immutability,
arguing that a trait is immutable when it is either too difficult to
change the trait or when the trait is too valuable to expect change.
But this just raises further questions: for instance, how difficult is dif80
81
ficult? Unsurprisingly, courts and scholars alike have struggled to
answer this type of question.

78
79

80

Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1996) (stating “the definition of an immutable characteristic is one that is unchangeable”); Gabriella A. Davi, Note, A Progression
Towards Freedom: Protecting the Disabled Under the Ku Klux Klan Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
1019, 1020 n.9 (1999) (noting that “Webster’s Dictionary defines immutable as ‘not capable
or susceptible of change’” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1131 (3d ed. 1986)); Ben Geiger, Note, The Case
for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2006) (discussing
Frontiero and noting that the “dictionary definition of immutable is ‘not capable or susceptible of change: invariable, unalterable’”); Steven M. Ziolkowski, Note, The Status of
Weight-Based Employment Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Cook v.
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 74 B.U. L. REV.
667, 678 n.70 (1994) (stating that “[a] condition is ‘immutable’ if it cannot be relieved”).
There have been some cases that argue immutability cannot apply to cases where the
trait is behavioral in nature. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). It is not clear if they are working with a different definition of immutability
which precludes conduct-based traits from being deemed immutable, or if it is simply a
separate doctrinal side constraint. At least one author has suggested that these cases represent a category of “passive immutability,” which requires that the immutable trait be
something that can be developed without action. On this account, “passive immutability”
is meant to be differentiated from a trait that simply cannot be changed. See Chai R.
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
237, 242 (1996) (distinguishing “passive” immutability”).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[S]ex . . . is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth . . . .”).
Stein, supra note 41, at 70 (arguing the immutability factor is selectively applied, as sex is
considered a suspect classification, yet it can be changed). But see Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding that sex is a characteristic that, for legal
purposes, is fixed at birth).
Consider the following analysis presented by the Ninth Circuit in Watkins v. United States
Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989):
It is clear that by “immutability” the Court has never meant strict immutability in
the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to change or mask
the trait defining their class. People can have operations to change their sex.
Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People can frequently hide their national origin by changing their customs, their names, or their associations. Lighter skinned blacks can
sometimes “pass” for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even
change their racial appearance with pigment injections. At a minimum, then, the
Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it
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Indeed if our analysis were to stop here, we should pause and
wonder whether immutability, on this account, can be a useful doctrinal tool. For example, is being a baseball player truly immutable?
Some people just could not hold any job except the one they have—
or at least so they think. How about being Christian? Can religionists
82
This type of analysis
really see themselves as simply converting?
forces judges down into the murky waters of political philosophy and
83
psychology. Such a construction of immutability almost defies application.

81

82

83

would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a
traumatic change of identity. Reading the case law in a more capacious manner,
“immutability” may describe those traits that are so central to a person’s identity
that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to
change them, regardless of how easy that change might be physically. Racial discrimination, for example, would not suddenly become constitutional if medical
science developed an easy, cheap, and painless method of changing one’s skin
pigment.
Id. at 726 (internal citation omitted).
See Marcosson, supra note 4, at 653 (“This in turn raises the immediate question: what
constitutes a ‘substantial’ cost or difficulty, sufficient to render the characteristic substantially immutable?”); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 412 (“Given immutability’s problematic nature, the Court should explicitly adopt the ‘effective immutability’ approach of Judge William Norris in Watkins.”). This type of analysis, in turn, leads to peculiar questions about
the potential immutability of all sorts of human characteristics. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa,
Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293,
334–35 n.262 (1989) (arguing that the in fact obstacles to learning a new language justify
the conclusion that foreign language speakers ought to constitute a protected class); Elizabeth Kristin, Comment, Addressing the Problem of Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90
CAL. L. REV. 57, 71 (2002) (“I assume that to be fat is not necessarily unhealthy and that
weight is either immutable or so difficult or dangerous to permanently change as to be
practically immutable.”).
See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that “there is no more justification for discrimination
against individuals because of their sexual orientation, which is most frequently a happenstance of birth, than there is for discrimination against blacks, Hispanics or Asians—
or against Catholics, Jews, or Muslims, who at least have the option to convert”). As a
rule, few courts have considered whether religion is a suspect classification because such
claims are typically subsumed under First Amendment doctrine. See Yoshino, supra note
3, at 495 n.33 (“The existence of the First Amendment has generally prevented courts
from entertaining the claim that religious classifications deserve heightened scrutiny.”);
Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 191, 204 (1995).
See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614–16 (Md. 2007) (citing to a variety of conflicting psychological and biological studies regarding the immutability of homosexuality,
but concluding that no studies could be considered by the court because they did not satisfy any of the evidentiary standards for admissibility of scientific evidence); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330–31 (D.C. 1995) (explaining that although some
might argue the judicial context is not the appropriate context for fact-finding regarding
“the nature and causes of homosexuality,” the court would make such findings upon fur-
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However, if scanning the secondary literature is any indication,
the most formidable problems posed by immutability to equal protection doctrine do not stem from such slippery slope arguments; more
often that not, scholars point to the fact that it is far from clear what
role immutability is meant to play in determining whether a particular classification should be deemed suspect. Indeed, a number of
scholars have noted that immutability is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion for deciding whether to deem a particular classifica84
tion suspect. Thus, they argue that the disabled, for example, are a
85
class with an immutable trait yet are not considered suspect, while
alienage is not an immutable trait yet alienage is a suspect classifica86
tion. The fact that immutability is neither a necessary nor sufficient
criterion for suspect classification status inevitably gives rise to questions about whether immutability is doing any doctrinal work that ac87
tually serves the overall purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.

84

85
86

87

ther presentations by the party, in reliance “not only on case law but also on scientific and
social science sources proffered by the parties—and found on [the court’s] own”).
This debate has also, to some extent, been one of the preoccupations of recent contemporary theory. Unsurprisingly, no decisive blows have been landed. For an overview,
see SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 148–71 (1992); RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE: POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM (John M. M. Farrell trans.,
1994); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY
239–52 (2d ed. 1999); AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL
GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 121–30, 171–79 (Joel Anderson trans., 1995); ALASDAIR
C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); CHARLES
TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187–210 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 185–98, 502–06 (1989);
Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81
(1984).
See Halley, supra note 3, at 966 (describing “the counterfactual assertion that homosexuality . . . is immutable”); Spitko, supra note 3, at 598 (arguing that “immutability of a characteristic is neither a prerequisite to nor a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny of
a classification relating to that characteristic”); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the
Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1994) (“Mutability, however, is not the decisive factor.”);
Tribe, supra note 3, at 1073 (“[F]eatures like immutability are neither sufficient nor necessary.” (citations omitted)); see also Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir.
1986) (“But immutability is not the sole determining factor. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that aliens form a suspect class.”).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect class).
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 3, at 1073 n.52 (so noting). For the proposition that alienage is
a suspect classification, Tribe cites Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). The first Supreme Court case announcing alienage as suspect was Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). There is nearly universal agreement among courts and scholars that alienage is
mutable; however, we will return to the application of immutability to the alienage classification in Section VI(b).
See supra note 84.
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But shuttling immutability from the current paradigm leaves the
“traditional” process-based indicia as the sole factors to determine
whether a classification should be considered suspect; such a result
has its own complicated consequences. Consider the following: what
are we to make of criminals as a suspect classification? Criminals
clearly fit all the “traditional indicia of suspectness.” Historically, they
have probably been discriminated against more than any other
group. And, given, for example, their lack of voting rights during in88
carceration, it seems hard to conceive of a group that faces more
formidable obstacles in trying to participate in the political process.
Others have noted the problem that criminals pose to process89
based equal protection analysis. But courts continue to struggle to
find reasons why criminals, or people with a criminal record, do not
constitute a suspect classification. Some courts, in addressing what
we might term the “criminal problem,” retreat to precedent: “The
Supreme Court has not announced that the status of ‘criminal de90
fendant’ is a suspect classification.” Other courts have simply dis91
Still other courts have ignored both
missed the idea as absurd.
process-based and immutability factors: “We can easily see a rationale
for a policy decision not to hire persons who have been convicted of
felonies even though they have been pardoned; a person who has
committed a felony may be thought to lack the qualities of self con92
trol or honesty that this sensitive job requires.” And they are willing

88

89
90

91

92

For a discussion of criminal disenfranchisement, see Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537
(1993).
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 3, at 1075. See generally Aukerman, supra note 77, at 51–66 (considering the applicability of suspect status to criminals).
Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 326 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d 1117, 1125 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[F]elons are not yet a protected class under
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1320 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Campbell, J., concurring) (same); Watson v. Cronin, 384 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D. Colo.
1974) (“[S]uch a classification has not as yet been held suspect.”); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F.
Supp. 573, 579 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (same).
Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Moreover, it would be ironic for the law
to confer special solicitude upon a class whose members had violated it.”); Ransom v.
Wainwright, 553 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If it is an attempt to assert that the statute infringes equal protection by creating an invidious class—felons—who are forbidden
to carry firearms, the argument is without merit.”); see also Zipkin v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16,
18 (2d Cir. 1986) (dismissing the possibility without analysis); Furst v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Greenwell v. Walters, 596 F.
Supp. 693, 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (same); Kindem v. Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1111
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (same).
Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970) (concerning police appointment). To be sure, Upshaw was decided before Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
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to do so even as they readily admit that the right to vote has been denied to felons, leaving felons as the ultimate political process outsid93
ers.
Indeed, Laurence Tribe believes the criminal problem demonstrates that the process-based view cannot guide equal protection
doctrine:
Burglars are subject to widespread hostility: indeed, the activity that defines the group is everywhere legislatively prohibited. Are burglars therefore a “suspect class”? Of course not. Suspect status is unthinkable—but
only because of the substantive value we attach to personal security, and
the importance for us of the system of private property and its rules of
94
transfer, which the burglary prohibition preserves.

The Court, most explicitly in Frontiero, believed that introducing the
immutability factor into suspect classification analysis would help ensure that statutes and regulations would impose “legal burdens” only
on classifications that bore some relationship to “individual responsi95
bility.” And yet, despite that fact, the immutability factor does not
appear to provide any leverage in addressing the criminal problem.
Indeed, it is far from clear how to apply the immutability factor to
claims on behalf of criminals who seek suspect classification status despite the fact that it would seem that criminals are the class most worthy of having legal burdens imposed upon them. If we define “being
a criminal” as “having committed a crime,” then the character trait of
being a criminal is immutable. We might, however, argue that people no longer incarcerated are ex-convicts; that is, they are no longer
criminals. But what about having a criminal record? On the immutability-as-exit view, having a criminal record is immutable. And,
given our earlier comments about how criminals fare when evaluated
on process grounds, it seems as if the class of people with a criminal
record would be a protected class and all enactments using such a
classification would be subject to strict scrutiny. Maybe, on this account, we should subject all treatment of ex-convicts on parole, for
example, to strict scrutiny. Indeed, some scholars have advocated
96
such or similar approaches.
93

94
95
96

Id.; see also Greenwell, 596 F. Supp. at 695 (reiterating the plaintiff’s argument that “prisoners are entitled to the intermediate level of review because they are politically powerless”).
Tribe, supra note 3, at 1075.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 77, at 85 (arguing that “courts should recognize that people with criminal records, like traditional suspect classes, lack political power and have
suffered a history of discrimination”); Geiger, supra note 77, at 1192 (stating that bases
for denying ex-offenders suspect classification standing does not survive analytical scrutiny).
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But this seems deeply troubling. Could it be that classifications of
ex-convicts (strict scrutiny) should be subjected to higher scrutiny
than sex-based classifications (intermediate scrutiny)? And yet, on
the process-plus-immutability paradigm we have no doctrinal tools in
our legal quiver to strike down such a conclusion.
Indeed, the fact that immutability both does little to eliminate
troubling classes from consideration for suspect status and does not
cohere in any obvious way with the process paradigm, brings its inclusion as a factor in equal protection analysis into question. And it is
this puzzling dynamic that has attracted the attention of scholars hoping to make sense of the factors used by the court to determine which
classes ought to be considered suspect.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE PROCESS-PLUS-IMMUTABILITY PARADIGM:
RESPONSES IN THE SECONDARY LITERATURE
The tensions between the process-based approach to suspect classifications and the immutability factor have not gone unnoticed. In
fact, the perceived irreconcilability of these two concepts has led to
the near universal derision of immutability as a useful mechanism for
97
approaching the construction of protected classes.
One recent
scholar has described critiquing immutability as “flog[ging] a dying
98
horse.” Unsurprisingly, this deep skepticism that immutability has
anything to offer informs the various approaches taken by scholars
hoping to address how we should understand immutability.
The ambassador of the pure process-based interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause—John Hart Ely—has simply bit the proverbial bullet in analyzing the process-plus-immutability paradigm. On
the one hand, Ely argues that immutability is irrelevant to determining which classes ought to be deemed suspect:
[N]o one has bothered to build the logical bridge, to tell us exactly why
we should be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable characteristics. Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by
something he or she can’t do anything about, but I’m not aware of any
reason to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share
that feeling. Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation,
when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate

97
98

See Marcosson, supra note 4, at 647–48 (noting that “[i]t is difficult to find the last academic defense of immutability or the last call for stressing it in constitutional litigation”).
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 491.
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purposes. At that point there’s not much left of the immutability theory,
99
is there?

But if, as Ely claims, immutability does not do any actual doctrinal
work, he must come to grips with the “criminal problem.” On this
front, Ely does not disappoint, even if somewhat ambiguously:
[I]t may help to recall that all that labeling a classification “suspect”
means functionally is that a prima facie case has been made out and that
the inquiry into its suspiciousness should continue. If it turns out directly
to pursue a substantial goal . . . it will survive. Thus, for example, burglars are certainly a group toward which there is widespread societal hostility, and laws making burglary a crime certainly do comparatively disad100
vantage burglars. Such laws plainly should survive, however.

This is quite the conclusion. Ely believes that his process-based account turns criminals into a suspect classification. He does, however,
take the easy case of “laws making burglary a crime,” and concludes
triumphantly that such laws would survive strict scrutiny. But what
about the myriad of other laws that employ criminal classification—
would those obviously survive? Indeed, the frequency with which
courts have encountered the question of whether criminals constitute
a protected class indicates that many laws applied to criminals as a
101
group would not survive strict scrutiny. Ely might be willing to embrace such a conclusion, but I presume that most of us would not.
Unfortunately, living with criminals as a suspect classification appears
to be the fate of a pure process-based paradigm.
Recognizing this problem with a pure process-based paradigm,
other scholars have sought to introduce, either explicitly or implicitly,
substantive criteria to a predominantly process-based inquiry. For
example, Janet Halley has described her own project as advocating
“judicial review of substantive legislative choices that impinge on the
102
process of majoritarian decisionmaking.”
Others have sought to
construct new principles for determining whether a particular governmental initiative runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause by
eliminating process-based concerns and looking instead to the effects
of such initiatives on the existent social hierarchy. Thus the secondary literature is replete with theories that advance principles such as

99
100
101
102

ELY, supra note 3, at 150. Much of this critique is cited in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443 n.10 (1985).
ELY, supra note 3, at 154.
See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
Halley, supra note 3, at 965 (adopting First Amendment distinctions between speech and
conduct in order to determine when interference with legislation on substantive grounds
is legitimate).
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104

“the pariah principle,” the “anticaste principle,” and the “antidis105
In doing so, such theories give up on the
crimination principle.”
process-plus-immutability paradigm, as it is simply not up to the chal106
lenge of addressing the most difficult of equal protection cases.
These two extreme theories do share one feature in common:
they simply eliminate immutability from the equal protection equation. Others scholars have attempted to navigate a middle path
which at least considers the possibility that immutability can be integrated into the process-based paradigm—or at least they have done
so in order to then critique it. Such arguments claim that immutable
groups, unable to extricate themselves from their own suspect class,
107
are more likely to face animus in the political process.
In other
words, in cases where individuals cannot exit the group classification
because the classification criterion is immutable—that is, individuals
cannot change the relevant characteristic—group members are more
likely to be left out of the political process. Indeed, as Kenji Yoshino
has explained in his critique of the immutability factor, “process theory does not ask whether the legislation burdening the indistinct
108
group is just or unjust.”
Instead, it “seeks to discover and protect
groups that are systematically disempowered in the political proc109
ess.” Thus, on the process-based accounts,

103
104
105

106

107
108

109

Farber & Sherry, supra note 8.
Sunstein, supra note 8.
Fiss, supra note 8. There are still other theories on how we ought to determine which
classifications should be deemed suspect that look to non process-based criteria in the
hopes of locating a more stable principle that better coheres with the true impulse driving the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 8 (arguing that the real question for classification ought to be whether the particular characteristic can sustain a stable
social meaning); Tribe, supra note 3 (arguing that substantive justifications for the suspect classification status lurk behind the standard process-based account); Developments in
the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 8 (arguing in favor of granting homosexuality suspect status on multiple grounds including the equal worth of human beings).
This also seems to be the implicit tactic of other theories that eliminate the entire multiple tier framework adopted by the court in order to avoid both procedural and substantive constructions of suspect classifications. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 8 at 533 (arguing in
favor of a new context-sensitive test for evaluating potential Equal Protection violations,
including consideration of “whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or stereotyping of the class”).
For a discussion of this position, see Halley, supra note 3, at 929–33.
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 507; see also Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and
the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 614 (1994) (“Although this factor is
sometimes noted, in process terms it serves more as evidence that those with animus can
readily single out the objects of their hatred and direct their contempt at the chosen party than as an independent reason for suspending the presumption of constitutionality.”).
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 507.
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“[Immutability] can be justified by arguing that distinct groups are politically powerless because, inter alia, they cannot evade discrimination.
When confronted with discrimination, an indistinct group may temporarily or permanently escape it by changing or hiding its defining trait. Distinct groups do not have this chameleon-like ability and are thus subject
110
to the full force of discrimination.”

But such theories often fail because of the overwhelming number
of counter-examples. For example, age and disability are both immutable characteristics—once acquired, they are traits that cannot be
changed—and yet the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the no111
tion of granting them suspect classification.
Thus, if the goal of
such inquiries is to truly uncover new cases of process failure, it is
hard to see how the immutability factor is a useful doctrinal tool.
Finally, some scholars argue that immutability is important because it enables us to determine whether the classification in question
112
is in fact relevant for legislative consideration.
This additional
prong for granting suspect class status gives us a more complete picture—or so the argument goes—of whether the characteristic in
question is legitimate for lawmakers and other government officials
to consider in their deliberation about and application of the law.
But pursuing such an explanation requires explaining why courts use
113
immutability instead of considering relevance directly. While some
argue that immutability is simply another useful indicator for rele114
vance, it seems difficult to believe that no other doctrinal indicators
would function more predictably.
In sum, the secondary literature provides little explanation for
why courts persist in employing the immutability factor within the
process-based framework of the Equal Protection Clause. Some scholars suggest that immutability helps us uncover process failures or irrelevant legislative consideration, but further examination does not
bear out their conclusions; immutability, upon initial consideration,
does not seem to be a doctrinal tool built for such purposes.

110

111

112
113
114

Id. at 507–08. To be sure, Yoshino is not only discussing immutability in these passages;
he is discussing what he terms the “assimilationist bias,” which includes both immutability
and visibility. For examples of the Court’s invocation of the visibility factor, see Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
Indeed the existence of counter-examples seems to have guided the Court in not granting suspect classification status to age and disability. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
See, e.g., Marcosson, supra note 4.
ELY, supra note 3, at 150.
Marcosson, supra note 4.
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V. IMMUTABILITY IN CONTEXT: CONSIDERING IMMUTABLE TRAITS IN
ASYLUM AND TITLE VII CASES
It is one of the central claims of this Article that much of the problem in understanding immutability’s role in equal protection doctrine stems from confusion regarding the very definition of the term.
Courts vary as to whether they understand immutable traits simply as
115
traits that the individual cannot change, traits over which the indi116
117
vidual has no control, or traits that the individual did not choose.
In choosing one definition over the other, courts sometimes simply
118
look to a variety of dictionaries.
On other occasions, and maybe
even more problematically, courts look to the way in which previous
courts, addressing the meaning of immutability in other contexts,
have understood the term. Indeed, while the immutability factor is
most well-known for its role in equal protection analysis, immutable
traits also play a significant role in both asylum and Title VII cases.
And, as we will see shortly, not only are the roles played by immutability in each of these contexts unique, but so are the understood definitions of the term immutability in those contexts. However, courts,
addressing equal protection claims frequently borrow definitions
from these areas of law in their search for an understanding of immutability. While an understandable tactic—looking to precedent when
faced with a definitional issue—this inter-doctrinal borrowing poses
significant problems for understanding the unique role of the immutability in equal protection analysis. But to understand this problem
requires first looking at the use of immutability in some of these other contexts. This is because the definitions of immutability are context-specific.
A. Asylum and Immutability: Protecting the Persecuted
The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to any indi119
vidual who is a “refugee.” The term refugee is statutorily defined as
an alien “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, [the country
of removal] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par120
ticular social group, or political opinion.”
The definition of the
115
116
117
118
119
120

See supra note 17.
See supra note 77.
See supra notes 19 and 75.
See supra note 77.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).

Oct. 2009]

SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS

29

term “social group” has proven somewhat elusive and continues to be
121
122
a topic of significant debate among circuits, scholars, and interna123
tional tribunals. It is here that immutability has become an important factor.
In its decision in In re Acosta, the Board of Immigration Affairs
(“BIA”) interpreted “the phrase ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
124
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”
In further defining what immutability meant in the asylum context, the BIA stated
that the “common characteristic that defines the group . . . must be
one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should
not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
125
identities or consciences.”
The reason the BIA advanced a more
expansive view of immutability in the asylum context—including also
traits that individuals “should not be required to change”—stemmed
from two factors. First, the BIA interpreted the term “social group”
126
in light of the other classifications in the list. Thus, political opinion was undoubtedly capable of being changed; in turn, the BIA incorporated the term immutability into the definition of social group,
but in a more expansive sense so as to parallel the other groups listed
127
in the asylum statute.
But even more importantly, the BIA adopted a more expansive
conception of immutability to remain in keeping with the principles
underlying refugee status: “[b]y construing ‘persecution on account
121

122

123

124
125
126
127

See, e.g., Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2007); Hassan v. Gonzales,
484 F.3d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 2007); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005);
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., Andrea Binder, Gender and the “Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of
the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167 (2001); Maryellen Fullerton, A
Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social
Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505 (1993); Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus
in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
777 (2003); John Hans Thomas, Seeing Through a Glass, Darkly: The Social Context of “Particular Social Groups” in Lwin v. INS, 1999 BYU L. REV. 799 (1999); Ellen Vagelos, The Social Group That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Should Homosexuals Constitute a Particular Social
Group for Purposes of Obtaining Refugee Status? Comment on Re: Inaudi, 17 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 229 (1993).
See, e.g., UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social
group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html.
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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of membership in a particular social group’ in this manner, we preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should
128
not be required, to avoid persecution.” Thus, refugees were those
who were, on some account, deserving of refuge in the United States
based on the nexus between their fear of persecution and their
129
membership in a particular social group. As a result, strict immutability—the ability to in fact change a particular trait—did not capture
the underlying impulse of asylum. Only a more expansive understanding of immutability—one that also incorporated traits that individuals “should not be required to change”—captured the purpose of
asylum law: “to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to
persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate . . . . admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian
130
concern to the United States.”
B. Title VII and Immutable Traits: Equal Employment Opportunity
As with asylum, immutability has been employed as a factor in Title VII jurisprudence. However, in contrast to the asylum context,
immutability is deployed for purposes of Title VII to capture a very
different type of organizing principle. Indeed, while asylum law is
primarily constructed to advance the needs of persons subject to persecution, Title VII doctrine has been built to navigate the “balance
131
between employee rights and employer prerogatives.” Thus, immutability’s use as a factor in Title VII law stems directly from courts try132
ing to navigate this complex balancing of values.

128

129

130
131
132

Id. at 234. In a recent decision, the BIA affirmed its analysis in In re Acosta. See In re A-ME- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A. 2007). However, in its decision, the BIA also
stated “that ‘wealth’ is not an immutable characteristic. This determination alone, however, is not dispositive if, for example, the shared characteristic is so fundamental to identity or conscience that it should not be expected to be changed.” Id. In this most recent
decision, the BIA appears to use immutability in the strict sense. Thus, even if a trait was
not immutable, according to the BIA, it could still serve as the basis for membership in a
“social group” if the trait in question “should not be expected to be changed.” In this
truncated statement, the BIA seems to understand traits that are not expected to be
changed to be mutable, but still potentially sufficient to satisfy the definition of a “social
group.”
See, e.g., Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2008); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d
150 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus
Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2002); Musalo, supra note 122.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
See, e.g., William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of
Our Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153 (2007) (describing
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The Supreme Court, in its landmark decision Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., explained that “[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of
133
Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment opportunities.”
Subsequent to Griggs, the question became how to implement the
equal-employment-opportunity principle. The success of implementing the principle hinged on a court’s ability to differentiate between
legitimate and illegitimate employment criteria.
The equal-employment-opportunity principle received significant
attention and explanation in the Court’s McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
134
Green decision.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp., the Supreme Court
faced a Title VII claim where the plaintiff alleged his former em135
The employer,
ployer refused to rehire him on account of race.
McDonnell Douglas, responded that its refusal to rehire was based
not upon race, but upon the plaintiff’s participation, arrest, and con136
viction for intentionally obstructing traffic. But these were no simple attempts to obstruct traffic; the plaintiff participated in these so
137
called “lock-ins” as part of coordinated civil rights protests.
And,
the plaintiff claimed that discriminating against him for his participation in civil rights protests amounted to employment discrimination
138
on the basis of race.
In deciding the case in favor of McDonnell Douglas, the Court
explained why the facts before it differed in an important way from
the facts of Griggs. In Griggs, the Court determined that the testing
device used by the employer had a disparate impact on African Americans and therefore the use of such testing devices violated the terms
139
of Title VII.
Thus, according to the Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp., the Griggs decision “dealt with standardized testing devices
which, however neutral on their face, operated to exclude many
blacks who were capable of performing effectively in the desired posi140
tions.” As a result, “Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

the overall purpose of Title VII as maintaining this balance); Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer
L. Gillan, Gender Performance over Job Performance: Body Art Work Rules and the Continuing
Subordination of the Feminine, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 319 (2007) (same).
401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
Id. at 796–98.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 794–96.
Id.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 806.
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cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder
141
In the case before it, the McDonnell Douglas Corp.
of their lives.”
Court concluded that the “disruptive” acts in question were in fact
material to job performance and were not beyond the control of the
142
employee. In this way, the equal-employment-opportunity principle
linked up with the Court’s emphasis on the employee’s or potential
employee’s ability to control certain traits or acts. If an employee either chose to act in a certain way or could change a particular trait,
then the Court would conclude that the individual had an equal opportunity to be employed; it was just up to that individual to bring his
actions and traits into alignment with what the employer wanted.
Courts have subsequently used the term immutability to capture
the “beyond control” requirement advanced in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. For example, in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
the Fifth Circuit addressed allegations of discriminatory hiring on the
143
basis of sex.
The alleged discrimination was based upon a groom144
ing code which required short hair for men, but not women. Alan
Willingham, the plaintiff, claimed that such a differential policy vio145
lated Title VII.
Holding that such requirements did not constitute a violation of
Title VII, the Fifth Circuit explained that Title VII’s guiding principle
did not prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of “chosen” traits: “[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured only
when employers are barred from discriminating against employees
on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national
146
origin.”
This formulation of the immutability factor has subsequently appeared in numerous cases and has become the default
doctrinal view in cases regarding employee dress and grooming
147
codes.
Indeed, as a notable example of the link between Title VII’s purpose and the definition of immutability in the Title VII context, con148
sider Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.
In Fagan, the court held

141
142
143
144
145
146
147

148

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1087–88.
Id. at 1091 (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Arnett v.
Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2000).
481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Oct. 2009]

SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS

33

that a particular employee grooming code did not constitute a violation of Title VII, drawing heavily on the Court’s rationale in McDonnell Douglas Corp. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit began by emphasizing
that “[p]erhaps no facet of business life is more important than a
company’s place in public estimation. . . . Good grooming regulations
reflect a company’s policy in our highly competitive business envi149
ronment.” In contrast, the court explained that “Congress has said
that no exercise of that responsibility may result in discriminatory
deprivation of equal opportunity because of immutable race, national
150
origin, color, or sex classification.” In applying both what it considered to be a legitimate employment requirement and the need to
protect employees from illegitimate discrimination, the D.C. Circuit
noted that “there are ‘societal as well as personal interests’ so involved in providing equal opportunities for citizens, that an employer
is not to be permitted under [Title VII] to discriminate because of
151
grounds ‘resulting from forces beyond [the employees’] control.’”
After emphasizing the importance of control in determining what
types of discrimination are prohibited by Title VII, the D.C. Circuit
concluded as follows: “[b]ut equally it seems obvious to us, that one
seeking an employment opportunity as in our situation where hair
length readily can be changed, may be required to conform to reasonable
grooming standards designed to further the employing company’s in152
terest by which that very opportunity is provided.” Thus, the court
held that the grooming code did not violate the terms of Title VII because the trait in question could easily be changed. In turn, the
grooming code did not impact the effected employee’s employment
opportunity—the employee could simply modify his hair length.
In sum, in Fagan, just as in McDonnell Douglas Corp., the court defined the immutability requirement in light of the principles animating Title VII. If Title VII, in balancing the interests of the employers
and employees, was intended to provide equal employment opportunity, then the immutability requirement would be interpreted to advance that principle. In turn, immutability in the Title VII context
has been understood to mean something completely different than it
does in the asylum context. In the Title VII context, an immutable
trait is a trait that is not under the individual’s control. Thus, an in-

149
150
151

152

Id. at 1124–25.
Id. at 1125.
Id. (second alteration in original). Indeed, footnote 23, attached to the foregoing text,
reads “[s]uch matter as we have quoted in this paragraph reflects the principles comprising the philosophy of the Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.” Id. at 1125, n.23.
Id. (second emphasis added).
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dividual is considered to have a mutable trait either if he chose to
adopt the trait or if he could easily change the trait. In this way, immutability in the Title VII context captures the control requirement:
a trait is beyond the control of the individual if he both did not
choose to adopt the trait and he cannot currently change the trait.
For this reason, race is the paradigmatic immutable trait in the Title
VII context as individuals neither choose to adopt their race, nor can
they change their race.
C. Thinking About Immutability in Context
As should be clear, importing the definition of immutability from
the asylum context into the Title VII context would likely lead to very
different outcomes in cases addressing grooming codes. Instead of
considering whether the trait in question was beyond the control of
the employee, courts would consider whether or not the trait was one
that the employee should be required to change. As a result, courts
would examine the connection between “grooming” choices and personal identity. In certain circumstances, courts might very well determine that certain grooming choices were simply too bound up
with individual identity to require employees to change their appearance. Indeed, such an approach has already been advanced by a
153
number of scholars.
But importing the definition of immutability from asylum cases into the Title VII context would be to misunderstand the principles
animating each doctrinal sphere. Rightfully or not, Title VII is understood as legislation aimed at balancing the autonomy of the em154
ployee against the business interests of the employer. In navigating
these competing values, the courts have interpreted Title VII as ad153

154

See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994) (discussing the
grooming cases without focusing heavily on their history or chronology); Paulette M.
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365
(1991); Roberto J. Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate
Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195 (2003) (arguing for the elimination of the immutability requirement under Title VII); Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee
Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 860
(1994) (arguing that Title VII should be amended to include a prohibition against workplace discrimination on the basis of ethnic traits); Ponte & Gillan, supra note 132; Post,
supra note 147; Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004); Mary Whisner, GenderSpecific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982); Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
See supra notes 131–52.
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vancing the principle of equal employment opportunity and used an
155
immutability criterion that is meant to capture that principle. As a
result, the term immutability has a very specific meaning when deployed in Title VII cases.
In contrast, asylum law is built to address a very different set of
problems. While there are any number of individuals who have reason to seek protection in the United States, asylum law must find a
way to differentiate between those who are in the most desperate
156
need of protection. In doing so, asylum differentiates by examining
the nexus between the persecution and the rationale for that perse157
cution. In such a context, the immutability criterion does not seek
to help determine which individuals could have avoided persecution,
but which individuals were persecuted for traits that we view as having
value. It is for this reason that immutability in the asylum context is
not concerned with whether the traits in question were beyond the
control of the persecuted, but whether the traits in question are the
type that the individual should never have had to change.
Immutability means different things in different contexts. In the
Title VII context, immutable traits are traits you neither chose to
adopt nor could you change. In the asylum context, a trait is considered immutable so long as you should not have been required to
change it. And in each context, these varying definitions are linked
to the principles the immutability factor is meant to capture. This
analysis leads to two conclusions. First, despite the propensity of
158
courts for doing so, importing the definition of immutability from
one context to the other does not make much sense. Second, if we
are to understand the meaning of the immutability factor in the
equal protection context, we must first figure out what principle it is
meant to advance. It is to this second task that we now turn our attention.

155
156
157
158

See supra Part V.B.
See supra note 130.
See supra notes 119–30.
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442-43 (Cal. 2008) (relying on cases considering the immutability factor in the asylum context in defining immutability for the purposes of equal protection); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn.
2008) (same); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614–15 (Md. 2007) (refusing to rely on a
case defining immutability in the asylum context because the appellees neglected to present scientific or sociological studies supporting the contention that sexual orientation is
an immutable trait); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (considering the applicability of a case defining immutability in the asylum context to equal protection cases, only to reject doing so on the grounds that the case in question had been
overruled).
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VI. IMMUTABILITY IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CONTEXT: BACK TO
THE PROCESS-BASED PARADIGM
Examining the link between the definition of immutability and its
doctrinal context provides a framework for analyzing the meaning of
immutability in the equal protection context. In the asylum context,
immutability helped advance the underlying principle of protecting
others from persecution, enabling courts to differentiate between
those who were most in need of such protections and those who were
not. In the Title VII context, immutability helped advance the principle of equal employment opportunity, enabling courts to differentiate between those who were discriminated against for traits beyond
their control and those who were not. The question then becomes
what is the principle driving equal protection doctrine and how does
immutability help isolate cases where there have been equal protection violations.
159
We explored the answer to the first part of this inquiry above.
Current equal protection doctrine has crystallized the Equal Protection Clause into a constitutional provision aimed at protecting mi160
norities who might otherwise lose out to majoritarian politics.
Thus, equal protection doctrine employs a process-based paradigm,
which protects the discrete and insular minorities referenced in foot161
note four of Carolene Products.
In this way, the Equal Protection
Clause is meant to prevent process failures where political animosities
grab hold of political deliberations.
Moreover, by focusing on process as opposed to substance, equal
protection doctrine becomes a democracy enhancing tool, without
passing judgment on the substance of any individual claim of dis162
crimination.
Thus, courts look to determine whether, based on
past history, it is likely that a new piece of legislation represents another instance of discriminatory policies. In doing so, courts do not
consider whether a group is worthy of additional protection because
of who the group is. Instead, courts are meant to eschew substantive
moral judgments in favor of a process-based paradigm, which focuses
on the likeliness of discrimination and not the worthiness of protection.
However, as we have already noted, in emphasizing a purely process-based approach, equal protection doctrine remains vulnerable to

159
160
161
162

See supra Parts II–III.
See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.
Id.
See generally ELY, supra note 3, at 30–32, 135–79.
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what we have termed the “criminal problem.”
While focusing on
process ensures that groups receive protection when it appears likely
that they have been discriminated against, it also precludes the use of
substantive moral judgments even when doing so seems intuitive. Accordingly, a pure process-based account does not provide any analytic
tools for explaining why criminals ought not to be considered a suspect classification. Focusing on the history of discrimination against
criminals, it would seem possible, if not likely, that current legislation
restricting criminals is the result of political animosities. In turn, the
current paradigm would, on one level, recommend subjecting legislation affecting criminals to heightened scrutiny.
And yet, the obvious response to such a suggestion is that criminals are deserving of “discrimination.” Indeed, criminals are being
punished for their own actions. The problem, however, for the pure
process-based paradigm is that such judgments—who is and is not
“deserving of discrimination”—are the very types of judgments a focus on process is meant to avoid. In other words, a pure processbased paradigm cannot differentiate between race-based classifications and criminal-based classifications.
It is this Article’s contention that immutability was deployed in the
equal protection context, in part, to solve the criminal problem.
However, as with the other contexts in which immutability plays a
doctrinal role, to see how immutability helps solve the criminal problem requires defining immutability in a way that fits with the overall
principles animating equal protection doctrine.
A. Redefining Immutability as Concerned Solely with Entrance Cases
The central claim of this Article is that immutability—when considered in the equal protection context—means something different
than it does in other contexts. This is because, like other uses of the
immutability factor, the meaning of the term varies depending on the
principle it is meant to advance.
The Equal Protection Clause, in constructing suspect classifications, seeks to ensure that discrete and insular minorities are pro164
tected from the animus of the majority. To see how the immutability factor could further that purpose requires looking back at the
Supreme Court’s first articulation of the factor in Frontiero v. Richardson:

163
164

See supra Part III.
See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of
their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal bur165
dens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .”

In linking immutability to the notion of individual responsibility, the
Frontiero Court invoked a line of cases in which the Supreme Court
166
announced that it considered illegitimacy a suspect classification.
In the illegitimacy cases, the Court emphasized that “no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an in167
In
effectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”
turn, the Court concluded that penalizing illegitimate children violated the Equal Protection Clause: “the Equal Protection Clause does
enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of
168
birth.”
The Court reached this determination because “imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to indi169
vidual responsibility or wrongdoing.”
In grounding the immutability factor in its illegitimacy cases, the
Court focused on the way in which immutability might ensure that
laws impose liabilities only where doing so bears some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Illegitimate children clearly
have not engaged in conduct that deserves to have legal burdens imposed. They have simply acquired a trait through an “accident of
170
birth.”
This was the core feature of the illegitimacy cases that the Court
hoped to capture in the immutability factor. Immutability was meant
to help weed out cases where classifications were being used to impose legal burdens on groups without a legitimate reason, and where
the burdens imposed bore no relationship to individual responsibility. But the link to the illegitimacy cases tells us about more than just
the principle at work. As with immutability in the asylum and Title
VII contexts, the principle animating immutability in the equal protection context also points to the definition of the term.
165
166

167
168
169
170

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
See generally Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage
Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2376 (2007)
(discussing the “Supreme Court’s case law confronting discrimination against illegitimate
children”).
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175; see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974).
Weber, 406 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 175.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
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As already emphasized, the Court, in first introducing immutability, focused on the fact that immutable traits are “accidents of
171
This, of course, makes sense in light of the fact that the
birth.”
172
Court was drawing on the illegitimacy cases.
But the reason that
the Court found imposing liabilities on illegitimate children so abhorrent is because the children never chose to enter into the classification; they were born illegitimate. Put differently, the Court was not
focused on whether such children would ever be able to exit the classification, but the fact that the children never chose to enter the classification.
Similarly, instead of using immutability to determine whether a
particular trait can or cannot be changed, immutability in the equal
protection context appears concerned with whether or not a trait was
173
chosen. In other words, the immutability inquiry in the equal protection context is not concerned with whether an individual can exit
the classification in question, but whether or not the individual chose
to enter the classification.
Examining the Court’s analysis in Frontiero also explains why, in
light of the principles animating the Equal Protection Clause, focusing on entrance makes sense. As discussed above, equal protection
focuses on classifications in an attempt to determine when certain
174
pieces of legislation are the result of inter-group animus. Classifications are useful because they can alert a court to a possible equal protection violation. Most of the time, classifications are harmless. A
rule that prohibits smoking in public places has a negative impact on
the class of smokers. However, this gives us little pause; through the
democratic process, a legislature has determined that a particular
course of conduct must be circumscribed. In other words, based on a
legitimate rationale, a legislature has determined that the class of
175
smokers “deserves” to be singled out for this type of treatment.

171
172
173

174
175

Id.
Id. (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
See United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Harris, 537 F.2d 563, 565
n.2 (1st Cir. 1976); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
See supra notes 47–76 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY:
AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM 34 (2002) (“If we consider virtually any law, we shall find that it is
much more burdensome to some people than to others. Speed limits inhibit only those
who like to drive fast. Law prohibiting drunk driving have no impact on teetotallers. Only smokers are stopped by prohibitions on smoking in public places. Only those who
want to own a handgun are affected by a ban on them, and so ad infinitum.”).
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Under current equal protection doctrine, courts are charged with
the task of identifying classifications that are not legitimate. However, it is hard to know when the use of a classification violates the
Equal Protection Clause. Under the current doctrine, courts are given a variety of tools to find likely cases where a classification has been
employed illegitimately. Some of those tools instruct courts to look at
the background facts regarding the likelihood that the members of
the class were able to participate in the process by which the relevant
176
piece of legislation was passed. In circumstances where a particular
group has limited political power and has been subjected to discrimination historically, courts have good reason to think that the use of a
classification singling out such a group is the result of inter-group
177
animus.
Such classifications serve as good candidates to receive
heightened scrutiny.
However, the Supreme Court also requires that courts consider
immutability in determining whether a classification should be
deemed suspect. The goal of the immutability inquiry is to determine whether there are reasons to believe that there is any link between individual responsibility and the legal burdens imposed by the
statute in question; if the classification’s trait is immutable, then it
would indicate that the individual members of the classification
should not have legal burdens imposed on them for membership in
the classification. But courts are interested in this inquiry not because they want to blame the members of a particular classification;
instead, the absence of a link between individual responsibility and
the classification makes it more likely that inter-group animus motivated the statute or regulation in question. This is because without a
link between individual responsibility and legal burdens, it becomes
increasingly likely that invidious discrimination may have driven the
drafting of the statute or regulation. Thus, the immutability inquiry
is simply another doctrinal tool for determining whether there is
good reason to believe that the use of a particular classification con178
stituted an equal protection violation; in such circumstances, courts
use strict scrutiny to further investigate the justification behind the
legislation or regulation in question.
It is here that we begin to see why understanding the immutability
inquiry as asking whether the members of the class chose to enter the
classification makes sense in the context of the Equal Protection
176
177
178

See supra note 44.
See supra note 58.
For further explanation of the process-based paradigm, see Helfand, supra note 46;
Rubenfeld, supra note 55.
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Clause. If immutability is a proxy for individual responsibility, then
the immutability inquiry ought to focus on whether the members of
the classification are facing legal burdens based upon a course of
conduct in which they engaged. A smoker, who faces the imposition
of burdens as a result of his smoking, faces those burdens because of
his conduct. If a statute imposed burdens on African Americans, they
would be facing burdens despite the fact that their membership in
the relevant classification is not based upon a chosen course of conduct. It is because the goal of the suspect-classification inquiry is to
determine whether inter-group animus motivated a statute that considering whether the individual is responsible for membership in the
classification makes sense. In turn, the immutability factor is meant
to further that inquiry by requiring courts to consider whether the
legal burdens imposed bear any relationship to individual responsibility. In circumstances where an individual was simply thrust into
the classification—by an accident of birth—imposing burdens on the
members of such classification would seem to derive from inter-group
animus.
Focusing on the ability to exit a classification, however, would
serve a different purpose. Consider again, for contrast, the use of the
immutability factor in the Title VII context. Under Title VII, the gov179
erning principle is equal employment opportunity.
In instances
where an individual claims that he has been rejected for employment
because of a particular trait, courts investigate whether the trait is
180
immutable. In doing so, courts balance the competing interests of
the employer and the employee, trying to determine why, in the particular case, the individual has lost out on a particular employment
181
opportunity. To do so, courts use the immutability inquiry to focus
on whether the individual had the “opportunity” to actually secure
the employment in question; if the individual is responsible for having the trait, then the individual can be deemed to have had the op182
portunity to secure the employment in question.
Thus, if the employer requires prospective employees to adhere to a grooming code,
the fact that a potential employee could have modified his appearance to comply with the grooming code—but failed to do so—would
mean that the employee had the opportunity to secure the employ-

179
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See supra notes 131–52 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.B.
Id.
See generally Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of
Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483 (2004) (noting the importance of voluntarism in the context of Title VII).
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ment. In turn, it is the prospective employee who is, under the current Title VII paradigm, to blame for the fact that he lost out on the
183
Indeed, it is for this reason that some
employment opportunity.
have criticized the current Title VII paradigm as being, at bottom, a
184
“blame game.”
And this is why immutability, in the Title VII context, is defined in such a way to allow courts to consider both whether
or not an individual chose to enter the classification and whether or
not he could still exit the classification.
Similarly, in employing immutability in asylum cases, courts focus
on whether an individual can or should be required to exit a particular classification. This type of inquiry—focusing on exit—makes
sense when the principle in play is determining who is most deserving
185
of asylum protections. Such an inquiry focuses on the substance of
the asylum seeker’s claim; is the asylum seeker, in light of the type of
persecution he has experienced, sufficiently worthy of being granted
asylum? Thus, immutability in the asylum context is aimed at evaluating the asylum seeker’s ability to exit the classification in question
and the costs of doing so. In turn, the immutability inquiry, in the
asylum context, asks courts to determine whether the trait in question
is one the individual “cannot change, or should not be required to
186
change.”
In contrast, under the Equal Protection Clause, courts do not care
who is to blame for the imposition of particular legal burdens or how
important a particular trait is to the members of a particular classification. Instead, under the process-based paradigm that animates
current equal protection doctrine, courts are simply interested to
know whether some link exists between imposing burdens on a particular classification and individual responsibility. In other words, the
question is not whether the classification’s members could have
avoided the burdens imposed by changing their traits, but whether
there is a good reason for imposing the burdens in the first place.

183

184
185
186

Of course, if Title VII were reconceptualized as advancing a different principle, then the
definition of immutability in the Title VII context also would need to change. For this
reason, critiques of the current Title VII paradigm invariably focus on the problems
caused by the current immutability inquiry under Title VII. See Farrell, supra note 182, at
483 (arguing that the use of voluntarist ideology in Title VII jurisprudence is deeply problematic and needs to be rethought); Post, supra note 147, at 16, 33–40 (arguing that the
“dominant conception of American antidiscrimination law, distorts and masks the actual operation of that law, and by so doing, potentially undermines the law’s coherence and usefulness as a tool of transformative social policy”).
See Farrell, supra note 182.
See supra note 128–30 and accompanying text.
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added).
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When there does not appear to have been a good reason for imposing legal burdens on the classification in the first place—that is, when
there does not appear to be a link between individual responsibility
and the imposition of legal burdens—courts think it increasingly likely that inter-group animus may have motivated the statute or regulation in question. And it is in such circumstances where heightened
scrutiny is appropriate.
The immutability factor, in the equal protection context, was built
to investigate this very question. In order to determine the link between individual responsibility and the legal burdens imposed, immutability looks to see whether or not burdens are a result of a chosen trait or a chosen conduct. When it is not—when the trait or
conduct in question is a mere accident of birth—then courts have
good reason to apply heightened scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute or regulation. By focusing on entrance into
the classification, courts can use the immutability factor as another
useful tool in its process-based inquiry.
One can see how the immutability-as-entrance paradigm links
immutability to the principle of personal responsibility by consider187
ing its impact on the “criminal problem.”
As discussed above, a
pure process-based account of equal protection doctrine does not
provide any obvious answer as to why criminals should not be considered a suspect classification; criminals undoubtedly face discrimination and their inability to participate in the political process leaves
188
them quite powerless. While the Court clearly indicated in Frontiero
that the immutability factor was meant to ensure that legal burdens
189
would be tied to individual responsibility, on the prevailing view
that defines immutability as unable to change, it is far from clear how
deploying the immutability factor could help exclude the class of
criminals from the ranks of suspect classifications.
The link, however, between individual responsibility and immutability comes into focus once we consider immutability’s definition in
context. Linked to the “accident of birth” language in Frontiero, the
190
Court extracted immutability from its illegitimacy cases. Thus, the
immutability inquiry, in the context of the Equal Protection Clause,
asks courts to determine whether a particular trait was adopted volitionally. Such an inquiry—focusing on whether an individual chose
to enter a particular classification—enables a court to consider
187
188
189
190

See supra Part III.
See supra note 88.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973).
See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
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whether imposing legal burdens on a particular class stems from a
chosen course of action. Applying this brand of equal protection
immutability to the class of criminals would clearly preclude them
from becoming a suspect classification; criminals have chosen to engage in a set of acts and in turn they have suffered consequences
stemming from those acts.
Indeed, this basic link between thinking about immutability as
concerned with coerced entrance into a classification and the principles of the Equal Protection Clause has led a number of courts to rely
on Frontiero’s “accident of birth” language in disposing of difficult
191
claims for deeming criminals a suspect classification.
In addition,
the D.C. Circuit concluded, in a case addressing whether World War
II veterans could constitute a suspect class, that “the ‘immutable characteristic’ notion, as it appears in Supreme Court decisions, is
tightly-cabined. It does not mean, broadly, something done that
cannot be undone. Instead, it is a trait ‘determined solely by accident
192
of birth’ . . . .” Thinking about immutability in this way captures the
general intuition that there is nothing inherently suspect in imposing
legal burdens on individuals for their conduct; indeed, such an approach is an understood premise of criminal and civil liability more
generally.
In this way, the Court deployed immutability as another indication
of whether the use of a particular classification was likely a function
of inter-group animus. Where classifications are based upon a trait
that is an accident of birth—that is, an immutable trait for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause—courts have another reason to
deem the classification inherently suspect. To impose legal burdens
under such circumstances would be to impose burdens on individuals
for having a trait that they never could have avoided. Under such
circumstances, it would be highly unlikely that the proposed burdens
had a relationship to individual responsibility. Instead, they are more
likely a function of inter-group animus and should therefore be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, the immutability factor
addresses the criminal problem by advancing the principle of indi-

191

See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 537 F.2d 563, 564 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976) (rejecting the application of the accident of birth classification to felons); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp.
753, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same).

192

Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal citations
and emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir.
1999) (noting that the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a classification is suspect
when entry into the class is voluntary).
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vidual responsibility, which the Court has understood as standing at
the center of the Equal Protection Clause’s process-based paradigm.
B. Necessary But Not Sufficient: Reconsidering the Alienage Classification
The criminal problem, however, was just one of the criticisms leveled by scholars against the immutability factor. In addition, scholars
have expressed particular skepticism regarding the utility of the immutability inquiry, given that it does not appear to be either a necessary or a sufficient requirement for suspect classification status. As we
noted above, when critics of immutability claim that immutability is
not a sufficient criterion for suspect classification status, they point to
a host of immutable traits that are not suspect, for example: disabil193
ity, height, and age. But when arguing that immutability is not nec194
essary, only one example is ever presented: alienage. The fact that
alienage is the only example where immutability is not necessary for
suspect classification, makes it something of an anomaly, a case worth
195
more careful examination.
193
194
195

See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 3, at 1073 n.51.
See supra notes 84–86.
In fact, its “anomaly” status has led some commentators to wonder whether alienage ever
deserved suspect status. See, e.g., Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982) (describing the inclusion of alien status as “incomprehensible”); see also Yoshino, supra note 3, at 571 n.41 (arguing aliens
should not be given protected status because alienage is not immediately visible). This
reluctance to embrace alienage as a suspect classification also appears to have manifested
itself in the “political function” exception to alienage’s suspect classification status:
“[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within
a State’s constitutional prerogatives . . . . [and] constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office holders.” Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
648 (1973) (establishing the political function exception and applying the exception to
civil servants); see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (applying the exception to “peace officers”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (applying the exception
to public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (applying the exception to police officers). But see Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (refusing to applying the exception to notary publics).
The secondary literature is replete with innumerable views on the political function
exception. Some authors have been generally critical of the Court’s willingness to apply
the political function exception. See, e.g., ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 29–53 (1985); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977). Others have seen
it as an important and helpful example of context-sensitive equal protection analysis. See
Goldberg, supra note 8. Still others have argued that the political function exception
rightfully returns authority over particular political determinations to the states. See Earl
M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1135 (1996). And another group of scholars have,
while approving of the general thrust of the Court’s alienage jurisprudence, expressed
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The Court first announced alienage as a suspect classification in
1971, stating the following:
But the Court’s decisions have established that classifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and insular” minority (see United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–153, n. 4 (1938)) for whom such height196
ened judicial solicitude is appropriate.

The Court did not elaborate on why alienage was like nationality and
race, but the citation to Carolene Products does seem to indicate that
197
the argument is being made on process-based grounds. The Court
has, however, on one occasion, stated that it believes alienage to be
immutable:
And the presumption of statutory validity may also be undermined when
a State has enacted legislation creating classes based upon certain other
immutable human attributes. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(national origin); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (alienage); Gomez v.
198
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (gender).

In fact, combining the Court’s decisions in Graham v. Richardson and
Parham v. Hughes, gives the distinct impression that the Court sees
alienage as fulfilling the criteria necessary for suspect classification
199
status under the process-plus-immutability paradigm.
But under
conventional wisdom—which defines immutability as the inability to
200
change —it is far from clear how alienage could be considered an
immutable trait.

196
197

198
199
200

concern regarding the wide ranging application of the political function exception. See,
e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 63 (1985); Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1516, 1532–36 (1979).
Regardless of one’s view of the political function test, it seems clear that the Court
has been ambivalent about how to map the tiers-of-scrutiny approach on to the alienage
classification. Thus, aliens have been deemed a protected class although they often do
not receive the typical protections associated with that status. Indeed, this disconnect only further raises the question of what about the alienage classification led the Court to
deem it a suspect classification. This Article’s analysis of immutability hopes to provide
part of the answer to that question.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (footnotes and citations omitted).
See generally Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in
the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 606–16 (1994) (arguing state laws based
on alienage are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest).
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
Carrasco, supra note 197, at 606–16.
See supra note 77.
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Unsurprisingly, some courts have ignored the Supreme Court’s
201
conclusion and explicitly stated that alienage is not immutable. In
trying to reconcile the fact that one can change their alien status—an
alien can become a citizen—with the Supreme Court’s claim that
alienage is immutable, Kenji Yoshino has stated the following: “The
absence of analysis in [Parham v. Hughes], however, leads me to suspect that [the Supreme Court is] erroneously inferring that a group
202
is immutable if it has received heightened scrutiny.” Although understandable, concluding that the Court simply made a mistake
somehow seems false.
As should already be clear, under Frontiero’s “accident of birth” definition alienage is an immutable trait. This is because in our analysis, a trait is considered immutable in the equal protection context
when the trait in question was not chosen; thus, traits that are mere
accidents of birth are considered immutable. Indeed, given the principles driving the suspect classification inquiry, the fact that alienage
is immutable makes good sense. To subject an individual to liabilities
simply because he was born in a foreign country would run counter
to the Equal Protection Clause’s underlying principle: that the imposition of a burden must be a function of an individual’s personal liability or wrongdoing. As a result, the immutability factor helps advance the principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause by
further bolstering alienage’s claim to suspect classification status.
Indeed, this same dynamic appears to have been at work in the
Court’s subsequent analysis of the alienage classification. In Plyler v.
Doe, the Court dealt with a Texas statute that denied enrollment in
public schools to children not legally admitted into the United
203
States. In deciding the case, the Court held that the statute did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, in part, because illegal aliens did
204
This holding emphasized the fact
not constitute a suspect class.
that the class in question was made up of illegal aliens; as repeatedly
205
noted, aliens are a suspect classification. As part of its analysis, the
Court concluded that illegal alien status was not immutable. This
should come as no surprise—even on the conventional account, ille-

201

202
203
204
205

See, e.g., Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that “alienage is not immutable”); Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306 n.10 (D.P.R. 1992)
(referencing secondary literature for the proposition that alienage is not immutable).
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 495 n.33.
457 U.S. 202, 205–06 (1982).
Id. at 218–24.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).

48

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:1

gal alien status is not immutable because it is a status that can be
changed.
But in making its determination that illegal alien status was not
immutable, the Court did not mention the fact that such a status can
be changed; instead, the Court noted the following: “Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is
206
the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action.” In other words,
given the option of constructing immutability as either an exit or entrance criterion, the Court chose to employ immutability as an en207
trance criterion. Here again, the Court appears to focus its inquiry
on whether the imposition of liabilities can be tied to the wrongdoing
208
of the individuals in question. In making such a determination, the
Court invoked the immutability criterion to show that the imposition
of liabilities was justified because it was a function of conscious and
209
unlawful action. Irrelevant to the inquiry was whether the individuals that comprised the classification could exit the class; such an inquiry did not, apparently, speak to the question of whether the imposed liabilities bore any relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. In this way, it was the question of coerced entrance—
and not the question of possible exit—that enabled the Court to determine whether a particular classification should be afforded the
heightened protections of suspect status.
Thus, applying the “accident of birth” definition of immutability
addresses the critique that immutability is not a useful doctrinal tool
because it is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion for suspectclassification status. Once we understand why the Supreme Court
understood alienage to be immutable, then all classes that have been
deemed suspect are immutable, including alienage. In other words,
immutability is not simply a factor; it is a wholesale side constraint on
suspect status. Accordingly, understanding immutability as applying
to entrance cases avoids one of the most pronounced criticisms in the
secondary literature, solidifying immutability’s place in equal protec210
tion doctrine.
206
207
208
209

210

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 219 n.19 (“Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.”).
Id. at 220.
Indeed, the Second Circuit has cited Plyler for this proposition in concluding that cocaine
dealers, in challenging the Sentencing Guidelines, could not be considered a suspect
classification. See United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999).
It is also worthwhile to note that using immutability to focus on entrance into classifications as opposed to exit from them obviates the need to discuss how high exit costs must
be in order for a classification to be immutable. Although the need to make such a de-
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But linking immutability to the overall purposes of the Equal Protection Clause in this way leaves Ely’s critique unanswered. If the
immutability factor was intended to allow courts to better determine
whether or not a particular classification was legitimately relevant to
individual responsibility, then why not consider relevance directly?
VII. IMMUTABILITY VS. RELEVANCE: RESPONDING TO ELY’S CONCERNS
Claiming that immutability is best understood as a coerced entrance problem does alleviate some of the doctrinal difficulties discussed above. It avoids the criminal problem, explains why the Court
has understood alienage as immutable, and allows the immutability
factor to act as a necessary condition for suspect-classification status.
What it does not do, however, is explain another core perplexity regarding immutability’s role in equal protection doctrine. Why not, as
Ely suggests, simply use relevance instead of immutability in tandem
with process-based indicia as a barometer for suspect classification
211
status? If courts, on our account, are meant to use immutability to
help determine whether a classification is relevant to the legal burdens being imposed, then why use a proxy, when you can have the
real thing?
To understand why courts cannot consider relevance directly requires thinking about the overall purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause’s process-based paradigm. Ultimately, the purpose of the
Court’s employing its tiers of scrutiny structure is to determine
whether laws have been motivated by invidious discriminatory in212
tent.
The Court has focused on suspect classifications as a way of
isolating cases where it thinks it is likely that discriminatory intent was
213
driving the drafting of a statute or regulation.
A classification is

211
212

213

termination is not a problem in and of itself, the difficulties inherent in such a doctrinal
task make eliminating the need a clear virtue of the immutability-as-coerced-entrance definition. Indeed, it is difficult to develop a principled theory on why sex is immutable
while homelessness is not; both seem to be classes that are difficult, but not impossible, to
exit. However, an individual’s sex is undoubtedly assigned at birth, rendering it immutable for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
ELY, supra note 3, at 150.
See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Nevertheless,
we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”).
Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law
bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the dis-
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deemed suspect when courts have good reason to believe—based on
a history of discrimination and current political powerlessness—that
legal burdens are being imposed on a group because of inter-group
214
animus.
Such circumstances represent instances of processfailure—where a certain group is simply not able to get a fair shake in
the political process because of its limited size or because of the pervasiveness of bias against it.
The focus on suspect classifications is meant to avoid focusing on
the substance of the statute or regulation in question. Courts are
meant to consider the use of a particular classification without considering how exactly it has been used in the statute or regulation. To
allow courts to simply pass on the relevance of a classification to the
statute’s stated purpose would be to fail to take seriously the potential
indications that some sort of underlying discriminatory intent was at
work. Equal protection doctrine leans on its suspect classification
methodology in order to ensure that courts consider the way in which
histories of discrimination and the current political power structure
might have played a role in the statute or regulation under consideration. In this way, suspect classifications allow courts to focus on the
process through which legislation has been passed in order to provide heightened procedural protections to the groups who most need
215
them.
This is why considering relevance directly would be so problematic. In the construction of suspect classifications, courts are supposed to consider the process-based hurdles faced by certain groups.
Considering whether a particular classification was relevant would entail passing judgment on whether it was legitimate to impose a particular legal burden on the classification in question; put differently,
it would allow courts to ignore the procedural inquiry and determine
whether the statute was constitutional on the substance. Doing so
would strip precariously positioned groups of the procedural protections captured by the suspect classification inquiry. Indeed, this is
why courts are supposed to consider the relationship between the

214
215

criminatory impact—in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate
exclusion of Negroes from jury venires—may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds.”).
See supra note 44.
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not
to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”).
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classification and the goal of the statute only after determining what
level of scrutiny the classification deserves. To allow relevance to become part of the suspect classification inquiry would be to undermine
the process-based protections incorporated into current equal pro216
tection doctrine.
Of course, as we have noted, the traditional indicia of suspectness
do not, on their own, provide an adequate framework for considering
the existence of process failures. By themselves, they leave open the
possibility for criminals to become a suspect classification. As a result,
the traditional indicia of suspectness turned out not to be good
enough indicators that inter-group animus was motivating a particular statute. This is because in some instances there was good reason
for imposing legal burdens on a group—like criminals—that historically had been the subject of discriminatory legislation. Thus, courts
needed another indicator in order to better isolate classifications
where it was even more likely that inter-group animus played a role in
the legislative process.
Immutability is able to play that role. As opposed to relevance,
immutability can serve as a good indicator of whether discriminatory
intent has motivated a statute without requiring a court to consider
the substance of the statute. Immutability, understood as concerned
with accidents of birth, helps courts determine whether a statute,
which employs a classification, is likely the result of inter-group animus. In this way, it enables courts to evaluate whether the imposition
of legal burdens on a particular group is the result of inter-group
animus. In turn, courts can determine what level of scrutiny to employ in considering the connection between the ostensible purpose of
the legislation and the use of the classification. As a result, immutability can further the overall purposes of the process-based paradigm.
VIII.

CONCLUSION: THINKING ABOUT IMMUTABILITY AND SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE

This Article has advanced two primary propositions. First, that the
definition of immutable is contextual. This became clear when we
considered the definition of immutability in both asylum law and Title VII. In each context, the term immutability took on a different
meaning, depending on the principles the immutability factor was
meant to advance.
216

Janet Halley makes a similar point, claiming that such reasoning is implicit in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). See Halley, supra
note 3, at 928–29.
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We then considered how to define immutability in the equal protection context. In doing so, we looked to the principles animating
equal protection analysis, focusing on the Supreme Court’s introduc217
tion of the immutability factor in Frontiero v. Richardson.
The conclusion of our analysis was that, in the context of the Equal Protection
Clause, immutability was concerned not with whether or not a trait
could be changed, but whether the trait was voluntarily adopted.
This definition tracked both the Court’s “accident of birth” language
and drew upon the immutability factor’s roots in the Court’s illegiti218
macy cases.
Focusing on immutability as an accident of birth
helped explain why criminals should not be counted among the suspect classifications; in addition, it also explained why the Court has
described alienage as an immutable trait, rendering the immutability
factor a necessary condition for suspect-classification status.
Reconsidering the meaning and purpose of the immutability factor is particularly important at this juncture given the rise in litigation
over same-sex marriage. Courts, in assessing whether statutory
schemes prohibiting same-sex marriage are constitutional, invariably
delve into an analysis of whether sexual preference can be considered
immutable. Understanding immutable traits as accidents of birth
changes the terms of the debate over same-sex marriage in a number
of important ways.
First, it renders analysis over whether sexual preference can be
changed moot. This is an important development not simply from a
219
legal perspective. From Michel Foucault’s repressive hypothesis to
220
Kenji Yoshino’s theory of covering, scholars have worried about the
217
218
219

220

411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973).
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); see also Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628, 631–32 (1974).
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Repressive Hypothesis, in THE FOUCAULT READER 301 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). Foucault’s concern stems from the Enlightenment’s fascination with
science; in turn, this fascination gave birth to a “new persecution of the peripheral sexualities,” which “entailed an incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals.”
Id. at 322. Nowhere, on Foucault’s account, was this mechanism more evident than in the
reconceptualization of homosexual conduct into a category of homosexuality:
Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was
everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body
because it was a secret that always gave itself away.
Id. This reconceptualization—the shift from conduct to status—empowered Enlightenment scientists to employ science as a tool to exercise power over these new statuses to
manipulate, control, and cure the members of these “deviant” status groups. Id. at 322–
23.
See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006); Yoshino, supra note 153, at 772. Yoshino’s primary concern is the way in which
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effects of implying that sexual preference is something that requires
modification. To provide lesser protections to traits that can be
changed implies some sort of expectation that such a trait can and
221
should be modified. However, understanding immutability as concerned not with the ability to change a trait, but with whether a trait
was voluntarily adopted, ensures that equal protection analysis avoids
such implications. In this way, our definitional shift ensures that the
immutability factor is not deployed as a tool to ensure conformity and
assimilation.
Second, understanding immutability as focused on entrance into
the classification moves us away from the identity-based arguments
deployed by courts considering the constitutionality of legislation
that prohibits same-sex marriage. As noted above, while differing in
approach, the California, Connecticut and Iowa Supreme Courts all
focused on the way in which sexual orientation plays an important
222
role in the constitution of individual identity.
In turn, all three
courts reasoned that the important role sexual orientation plays in
the constitution of individual identity should affect the way in which
223
we understand sexual orientation to be a trait that can be changed.
However, if we understand the immutability inquiry as focused not on
the ability to change a trait, but whether the trait is an accident of
224
birth, identity-based arguments lose much of their traction as re225
lated to suspect classification analysis.

221

222

223
224

the law protects traits, but not actions. In turn, individuals are forced to mute some of
their own behavioral traits—to “cover” their true identities. Id. at 771–73. Yoshino expresses particular concern over the fact that traits that are mutable are not given the same
protections as immutable traits; this distinction implies an expectation that individuals
with mutable traits should in fact change them. Id.
Yoshino, supra note 153, at 877 (“Put differently, the descriptive claim that the group can
assimilate because of the mutability or invisibility of its defining trait transmutes into the
prescriptive claim that the group should assimilate with very little intervening investigation
by a court. Because of this, the immutability factor in equal protection analysis effectively
translates into a demand that mutable groups convert, and the visibility factor effectively
translates into a demand that invisible groups pass.” (emphasis in original)).
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa
2009).
See supra note 222.
To be sure, identity arguments could play a prominent role in determining whether sexual orientation is an accident of birth. See generally Stein, supra note 41 (discussing the
immutability factor in equal protection jurisprudence as the central legal context for the
“born that way” arguments for gay rights); Wardle, supra note 41 (focusing on the biological effects of homosexual behavior on human health). However, as demonstrated by
the recent spat of state supreme court decisions, identity arguments have been deployed
to meet arguments about the ability to change sexual orientation. It is these arguments
that an “accident of birth” focus renders irrelevant.
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On the other hand, shifting immutability’s focus away from exit
and towards entrance leads to other important questions. To say that
immutability is concerned with accidents of birth does not tell us
what an accident of birth is. Applying our definition of immutability
is particularly difficult once we begin to think about genetic dispositions. Should we consider people as being homosexual from birth?
Are some people simply wired, from birth, to be criminals? While
such individuals might only act on genetic predispositions later in
life, nothing in our analysis thus far precludes understanding such
traits as immutable. Indeed, given the volatile dispute over whether
sexual orientation ought to be considered a suspect classification, this
may be one of the central questions in future equal protection litigation.
In answering this question, different elements of the current doctrine point us in different directions. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has, at times, emphasized the fact that certain immutable traits
are also “visible.” For example, the Supreme Court, in finding that
“close relatives” did not constitute a classification, explained its holding by saying that close relatives “do not exhibit obvious, immutable,
or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
226
group.”
In Frontiero itself, the Court noted that “it can hardly be
doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and,
227
perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.”
Focusing on visible immutable traits is understandable. Only allowing the traits we can see—like race and sex—to count as immutable traits takes courts out of the business of trying to determine how
people are genetically wired. It therefore would allow courts to simply take traits like sexual preference and criminality and deem them

225

226
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Of course, identity arguments will likely continue to play a prominent role in legislative
initiatives providing for same-sex marriage. See, e.g., An Act Implementing the Guarantee
of Equal Protection Under the Constitution of the State for Same Sex Couples, No. 09-13
2009 Conn. Acts (Reg. Sess.) (removing gender identity requirements from the state statute governing marriage); An Act To End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, Me. L.D. 1020 (124th Legis. 2009) (to be codified at Me. P.L. 2009, ch.
82, § 650 et seq.) (same); An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections With Regard
to Marriage and Prohibiting the Establishment of Civil Unions On or After January 1,
2010, N.H. H.B. 73 (2009) (same); An Act to Amend the Domestic Relations Law, In Relation to the Ability to Marry, N.Y. Assem. Bill No. A7732 (2009) (attempting the same).
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (emphasis added).
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mutable; they are simply not the types of traits that are imposed, in
an obvious manner, at birth. Thus, by emphasizing some of the
228
Court’s gestures toward a “visibility factor,” courts could avoid deciding whether some genetic traits qualify as accidents of birth for the
purposes of the immutability inquiry.
But the visibility factor itself stands on uneven foundations. Most
229
notably, alienage is far from visible, and yet the Court has both
230
deemed alienage immutable and found alienage to be a suspect
231
classification. In doing so, the Court has expressed serious concern
that aliens might not receive fair representation in the political process, constituting one of the discrete and insular minorities current
232
equal protection doctrine was built to protect. Again, this is despite
the fact that alienage is not a visible trait.
Therefore, applying our definition of immutability in the same-sex
marriage context does not end the conversation; it actually begins the
conversation. But it does so in a way that constitutes a significant improvement. First and foremost, it instructs courts to get out of the
business of asking whether sexual orientation can be changed. Indeed, in this way, our own definition of immutability tracks some of
the identity arguments currently deployed by courts in cases address233
ing same-sex marriage.
Moreover, defining immutability as coerced entrance explains why
the immutability inquiry is relevant to equal protection analysis. In
turn, it draws our attention to the way in which immutability, along
with the traditional indicia of suspectness, can be used to determine
when certain groups are not able to avail themselves of the benefits
typically afforded by the democratic process. By reconnecting immutability to the process-based focus of equal protection doctrine, we
have framed the question courts must ask when considering whether
sexual preference is immutable: Is sexual preference the type of trait
228
229

230
231
232
233

See generally Yoshino, supra note 3, at 492 (describing the courts’ definition of visibility and
arguing that “visible groups are uniquely vulnerable in the political process”).
But see Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L.
REV. 425, 455 (1997). In his conclusion, Romero states that aliens are a “readily identifiable group of people, composed mostly of people of color.” Id. It is not clear, however, if
he is making an argument that alienage should be considered a visible trait, especially
given the piece’s focus on intersectionality.
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
Id.
See generally, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885
(Iowa 2009).
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that is simply thrust on the individual from birth? In answering this
question, courts should consider whether imposing legal burdens for
sexual preference bears some relationship to individual responsibility. As we have seen, a tenuous link between the imposition of legal
burdens on a group and the “basic concept of . . . individual respon234
sibility” provides a strong indication that the statute or regulation in
question was not the result of properly functioning democratic deci235
sion-making, but of inter-group animus. It is here that our inquiry
regarding whether sexual orientation should be deemed a suspect
classification should begin. Does what we know about the origins of
sexual orientation, combined with the history of discrimination
against homosexuals and their current share of political power lead
us to believe that legal burdens imposed based upon sexual orientation are the result of democratic deliberation or inter-group animus?
It is in the answer to this question that the future of same-sex marriage resides.
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Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that
all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”).

